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The present report provides an overview of the SFT project, namely key findings
and programmatic implications of the main SFT study as well as the three in-depth
analysis papers. It also describes main dissemination and utilization activities
undertaken under this project to reach policy-makers with the results to ensure
effective utilization.
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OVERVIEW OF SFT PROJECT
Background

•

Following a period of relatively rapid decline in the 1980s and early 1990s, the
Egyptian fertility decline slowed down during the later part of the 1990s. The 2003
Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey [EDHS] provided estimates of the
Total Fertility Rate [TFR] - births per woman over a reproductive career - of 3.2,
with levels in some segments of the population (e.g. rural Upper Egypt)
substantially higher (El-Zanaty and Way, 2004). In the segments of the population
where fertility is highest, unmet need for contraception (non-use among women
wishing to avoid pregnancy) remains a significant problem. However, in most
segments of the population unmet need has dropped precipitously during the past
fifteen years to relatively low levels. Given this considerable success of the national
population policy and family planning program, fertility desires now demand
primary attention. Why do a majority of Egyptians desire three or more births? Are
these aspirations likely to persist into the future?
The main objective of Slow Fertility Transition [SFT] project was to better
understand the current slow pace of fertility decline in Egypt and to identify policies
that can facilitate decline to replacement level, i.e. an average of two births per
woman. 3 This project investigated attitudes toward childbearing and, in particular,
receptivity to the two-child family.4 The SFT project re-interviewed a subsample of
3,286 currently married women who had been interviewed in the 2003 EIDHS. In
the follow-up interview, which occurred on average eleven months after the EIDHS
interview, those women were asked about their reproductive experience in the
period since the EIDHS interview, their attitudes about childbearing and related
issues, and some questions about household economics. Two further samples were
also interviewed in 2004 as part of the SFT project: a sample of unmarried women
and men aged 18-29 (917 women and 945 men) who were selected from the EIDHS
household sample. These young women and men were asked many of the same
questions as the ever-married women about their childbearing attitudes, and in
addition they were asked their attitudes and expectations about marriage.
With the successful completion of the data collection and data processing phase, the
priorities of the second phase of the SFT project were to complete scientificallysound and policy-relevant analysis of the SFT data, to ensure that the findings are
effectively disseminated to key audiences in Egypt, and to identify policies and
programs that would help the Egyptian government achieve replacement level
fertility by the year 2017. The second phase was implemented by the FRONTIERS
Program with funds from USAID. The second phase involved analysis of SFT data;
production of a series of publications and undertaking of dissemination and
utilization activities.
3 Initial title "Stalled Fertility Transition in Egypt" was changed to "Slow Fertility Transition" after
Interim Egypt DHS showed a fertility decline from 3.5 to 3.2
4 The first phase of the Slow Fertility Transition project, which involved data collection and analysis,
was implemented by the Population Council with funds from USAID, Mellon Foundation, CIDA,
and the Population Council. Data collection and processing were carried out by the Cairo
Demographic Center

Key findings
Main SFT Study
The SFT study addressed a series of key questions about the current status and
future prospects of the Egyptian fertility decline. 5 Clear answers emerged with
respect to many of these questions.
A first and very fundamental question is whether elimination of unwanted fertility,
with the rate of wanted fertility remaining as is, would be sufficient to achieve
replacement-level fertility in Egypt. The answer is no. Were unwanted fertility to
be entirely eliminated, the TFR would remain about one-half child above the
replacement-level TFR of 2.1 births per woman. But no society has been successful
in preventing all unwanted births. With the reasonable expectation that some
unwanted fertility will remain, reducing fertility in Egypt from its rate in 2000-2003
of 3.2 births per woman to 2.1 births per woman will require roughly equal
reductions in wanted and unwanted fertility.

Figure 1.1: Percent Wanting Two or Fewer Children
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Note: Whether women want two or fewer children is determined as follows. For women with fewer than two
children, this is determined by the number of additional births they desire. For women with two children, this is
determined by whether or not they desire to have another birth. For women with more than two children, this is
determined by their stated ideal number of births.

A second important question concerns the strength of attachment to a two-child
goal. Recent DHS surveys and the SFT indicate that a two-child family is favored
by a majority of married women of reproductive age. Further investigation in the
SFT of attitudes towards children (their costs and benefits) reveals widespread
recognition (among married women and young never married women and men) that
many factors - both economic and social - favor the two-child family.
5 Casterline, J. and Roushdy, R. 2006. Slow Fertility Transition in Egypt: Main report. Cairo:
Population Council.

What is striking from the SFT data is the clear indication of reluctance on the part of
many women and men to commit wholeheartedly to the achievement of this goal.
For example, among women whose stated ideal is two children, two-thirds said it
would matter "not at all" or "little" if they had one child more than this ideal. (To be
sure, this acceptance of having one child in excess of the number desired is matched
by an acceptance of having one child less than desired, if that happens to be the
reproductive outcome.) When asked what they consider the maximum number of
children acceptable for an Egyptian couple, the most common response was three.
One-quarter of respondents consider a gain in income as a motivation to have more
children, a distressing suggestion that improved economic conditions in Egypt might
have a pro-natalist effect. The respondents were also asked whether couples could
largely control the number of children they have; over 40 percent of women said this
is beyond the control of couples. Overall, these data reveal a weak attachment to
expressed fertility ideals. In all likelihood the underlying belief that childbearing
cannot be fully controlled by a husband and wife that actual reproductive
outcomes are unpredictable - leads to an acceptance of unwanted births (i.e., births
in excess of the couple's desired number).
An important factor that undermines the attachment to the two-child goal is
aspirations for the sex of children. The SFT data indicate that most Egyptians wish
to have both a son and a daughter. This works against replacement-level fertility,
because one-half of the couples with two children will lack either a son or a daughter
and hence would opt for a third child.
A third question addressed by the SFT is whether the fertility attitudes and desires of
the younger generation, specifically those not yet married, will facilitate the
transition to replacement-level fertility. To this end, the SFT interviewed young
never married women and men at some length about their fertility attitudes and
desires. The expectation was that the data would show that these young women and
men desire fewer children and are more strongly attached to this goal than are
married women. But the data do not confirm this expectation: as it turns out, the
fertility attitudes and desires of the married and never-married respondents were
overall quite similar. This is a significant finding: replacement-level fertility in
Egypt will not occur automatically through generational succession, i.e. the
replacement of older cohorts by younger (and, it is often assumed, more
"progressive") cohorts.
Fourth, while the SFT invested more effort in the investigation of fertility attitudes
and desires, with the aim of gaining a better understanding of wanted fertility, the
SFT also provided an unusual opportunity to study unwanted and mistimed fertility.
Because the SFT respondents were interviewed about eleven months earlier in the
EIDHS, unwanted fertility in the interim period can be assessed prospectively.
Whether or not births and pregnancies between the two surveys were unwanted can
be determined by the women's stated preference in the EIDHS interview to have
another birth or not. In contrast, retrospective estimates of the fraction of births
unwanted are known to be downwardly biased, because of women's reluctance to
label a young child as "unwanted". According to the prospective estimates
calculated from the SFT, unwanted and mistimed fertility are higher than
retrospective DHS estimates have indicated: about one-quarter of recent births and

pregnancies are unwanted, and about one-half of recent pregnancies occurred sooner
than planned by respondents. Exploring the correlates of unwanted births and
pregnancies, the SFT data reveal that about sixty percent of the unwanted births
occur to women who were using contraception at the time of the EIDHS; that is, a
majority of unwanted births might be attributed to ineffective contraceptive use and
discontinuation of contraception. Women with unmet need at the time of the EIDHS
(i.e. not using contraception) contribute about one-third of the unwanted births, but
this is quite disproportionate to their size in the population (about ten percent of
women). This supports the argument that reaching women with unmet need should
remain a policy and program objective.
Finally, the SFT considered reasons why many women do not use contraception
consistently and effectively. Undoubtedly one factor is negative perceptions of
contraception, in particular perceptions that the most common methods cause
negative health side effects. When asked, a majority of SFT respondents
spontaneously mentioned two or more health side effects of the IUD and the oral
contraceptive, the two most commonly used methods in Egypt. A majority also
indicated when asked that they had heard of someone in their community suffering
from side effects. Such perceptions of health risks associated with contraceptive
practice serve as a disincentive to the adoption of contraception and, more
importantly, to effective and continuous use of contraception.
The main SFT study concludes with a number of policy recommendations to help
achieved replacement level fertility by the year 2017.6 According to the authors
national policies and programs should focus on reducing both wanted and unwanted
fertility for the country as a whole but for those segments of the population where
fertility levels are currently relatively high more emphasis should be placed on
reducing wanted fertility through enhancing acceptance of the two child family
norm.

In-depth Analysis Papers
In order to arrive at a better understanding of some of the findings revealed by the
study and to extract findings of programmatic value, three topics of high
programmatic relevance were selected for in-depth analysis. The analyses were
contracted to senior Egyptian researchers who are familiar with the Egyptian family
planning program. 7
The first paper "The path to replacement-level fertility in Egypt: Fertility desires and
family planning" by Laila O. El-Zeini, examines characteristics of women who
choose to progress beyond two children and compares them with those who stop at
two children. The paper adopts a conceptual framework that classifies women into
five main groups according to their degree of commitment to the two-child norm. At
one end of the spectrum are rejectors who are opposed to the idea of a two-child
family while at the other end are achievers who believe in this ideal and who have
managed to achieve this goal in their own families. Between the above two
6 For a more elaborate discussion of programmatic implications of SFT main study see Casterline. J.
and Roushdy, R. 2006. Achieving Replacement-Level Fertility in Egypt: Challenges and potential
opportunities. Cairo: Population Council, FRONTIERS Program.
7 A condensed version of each of the three papers is provided in this report

extremes stand women who accept this norm for others but not for themselves, those
who are indecisive/ambivalent and those who believe in the two-child family norm
but who have failed to achieve it.
The first paper "The path to replacement-level fertility in Egypt: Fertility desires and
family planning" by
Laila O. El-Zeini,
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commitment to the two-child norm. At one end of the spectrum are rejectors who are
opposed to the idea of a two-child family while at the other end are achievers who
believe in this ideal and who have managed to achieve this goal in their own
families. Between the above two extremes stand women who accept this norm for
others but not for themselves, those who are indecisive/ambivalent and those who
believe in the two-child family norm but who have failed to achieve it.
The study data indicate that although more than four-fifths of married women in
Egypt accept the notion of the two-child family, only one-fifth of women (19%) are
successful in achieving that goal through effective use of contraception. Son
preference was shown to be a strong predictor of rejecting the two-child family,
preferring more than two children, and ambivalence about having two vs. three
children. Also, son preference was found to be an obstacle to the achievement of the
two-child family. Less egalitarian gender attitudes were shown to be a major
obstacle to accepting the two-child family norm or preferring it for one's self. In
addition, optimistic economic expectations and a perception of low costs and high
benefits of children all seem to result in a higher likelihood of rejecting the notion of
the two child family. Ambivalence was found to be stronger among women who
have little communication with their husbands about reproductive matters and
among those are concerned about method side-effects. Women from higher
socioeconomic strata and those with weaker son preference are more likely to
achieve the ideal of two children. Interestingly, strong perception of negative sideeffects was not found to be a significant barrier to adoption of family planning
among women who are motivated to limit their children to two.
Finally, the paper proposes three sets of interventions that would help the Egyptian
government in establishing the two-child family norm and in helping couples
achieve that goal. The first set of interventions concerns improving quality of
family planning services, namely quality of counseling and variety of family
planning methods offered. The second set of interventions concerns media

messages to promote gender equality and acceptance of the two child family
regardless of the composition of children. The third set of interventions involves
long-term policies and programs to reduce the value of children through women's
education and employment, ensuring old security for couples and community
development activities.
.
.
The second paper "Childbearing and contraceptive attitudes of unmarried youth" by
Laila Nawar focuses on the receptivity to the two-child family norm as well as other
related childbearing norms among never married men and women aged 18-29. The
study results show that although the great majority of young men and women
recognize the advantages of having a two-child family, a substantial proportion
(47% of men and 39% of women) still consider having three children or more as
desirable. Like married women, unmarried men and women in this study have
shown weak attachment to the expressed number of desired children, with more than
one third of each group (39% of men and 44% of women) reporting that it would not
matter at all to have one more child than desired. Interestingly, among those who
are engaged to get married only two-fifths reported discussing his/her desired
number of children with the prospective marriage partner.
According to findings of this study, the desire for two or fewer children did not vary
substantially across socio-economic or demographic strata, with the exception of
those living in urban areas who were more likely than those in rural areas to desire
two or fewer children. Socio-cultural attitudes such as greater acceptance of
women's autonomy and having more egalitarian gender norms and more
modernized attitudes, on the other hand, were associated with a desire for two or
fewer children. The notion of delaying the first pregnancy is not popular among
young unmarried men
and women, with more
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Finally, the paper highlights the need for expanding premarital counseling services
for young men and women; establishment of youth friendly clinics on university
campuses and targeting youth through mass media, school curricula, awareness
raising campaigns ... etc. Messages for youth should promote responsible
parenthood, husband-wife communication and advantages of a two child family.

The timing of births may well be among the most important features of fertility in
societies in the process of fertility transition, as is the case with Egypt. The third
paper "Profile of Birth Spacing in Egypt" by Hassan Zaky, identifies factors that are
associated with achievement of optimal birth-spacing intervals (three to five years),
based on analysis of both the EIDHS and SFT data. According to the study results,
only 29 percent of non-first births occurring in the ten years preceding EIDHS
occurred following an optimal birth spacing interval (OBSI). The following
characteristics were found to be positively associated with the achievement of OBSI:
older age of mother at time of delivery (30+), mother working for cash, belonging to
highest economic quintile, survival of the previous child, previous child being a boy,
and receiving postnatal care services after birth of the pervious child.
This study also examined characteristics of women who indicated in the EIDHS that
they did not want to become pregnant within one year and yet became pregnant in
the one-year interval between the two surveys (EIDHS and SFT). These
pregnancies are assumed to be unwanted or mistimed. About one-half of the women
who did not want to become pregnant
Figure 1.4: Percent distribution of
actually became pregnant in the period
non-first birth intervals in six
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Finally, the paper discusses programmatic implications to help women achieve
OBSI. The recommendations focus on improving quality of postpartum services
especially postpartum family planning services, introducing OBSI messages within
antenatal and postpartum care services raising public awareness about the
advantages of OBSI for mother, children and entire family.

Policy and Program Implications
The findings of the SFT main study and the three in-depth analyses have important
policy and programmatic implications. Over the past 30 years emphasis has been
placed on providing family planning services and on raising awareness about family
planning and the advantages of a small family. However, there was little agreement
on what a small family means. While some programs have showed a small family
as one that is composed of two children others showed it as one that is composed of
three children. Moreover, media campaigns have consistently showed a happy
family as one that includes both a son and a daughter.

While the above strategy may have been successful in reducing total fertility rates
from 5.3 in 1980 to 3.2 in 2003, reducing the fertility from three children to two
children per family requires a more comprehensive approach. It needs multisectoral interventions that involve, besides the health sector, mass media,
community organizations, the Education sector, the Social Affairs sector, the Youth
sector.. .etc. Moreover, the target group should not be limited to married women of
reproductive age but should include husbands as well as unmarried youth as the
latter constitute the husbands and wives of the future. Population groups who are at
highest risk of unwanted or mistimed pregnancies deserve special interventions.
Following are some specific recommendations that have been derived from the
findings of the above studies.
Reduction of wanted fertility requires policies and programs that persuade
couples of the desirability of a two-child family, regardless of sex of the
children. Messages through mass media, health services and community
outreach programs should reinforce women's and men's positive attitudes
towards small families (maximum of two children) and should highlight the
costs of childbearing, the quality-quantity trade-off, and parents' responsibility
for the future well-being of their children.
Unwanted and mistimed pregnancies are concentrated in certain sub-groups of
the population. Of particular programmatic significance, a majority of unwanted
pregnancies occur to women who were recent contraceptive users (less than one
year prior to the conception). This underscores the critical importance of
improving contraceptive continuation through adequate counseling and effective
management of side-effects.
Although child death is a relatively rare event in Egypt, thanks to the successful
child survival program, efforts should continue to provide adequate postnatal
services for the mother and the newborn. Creating effective linkages between
family planning and postnatal services is needed for enhancing postpartum use
of contraception and achievement of OBSI.
Continued efforts are required to provide accurate information and appropriate
counseling for those women who wish to avoid pregnancy (temporarily or
indefinitely) but do not use any method of family planning. Addressing the
public's concerns about method side-effects should receive high priority from
both the health sector and the media.
Inter-spousal communication and agreement are crucial to adoption of the two
child family norm and to achievement of optimal birth spacing intervals. This
highlights the importance of targeting husbands with interventions that address
their attitudes towards childbearing, son preference and use of contraception.
Young men and women deserve special attention as they represent the parents of
the future. Premarital and pre-pregnancy counseling services should be
established to help engaged and newly married couples plan their lives
effectively. Couples should be encouraged to discuss with each other the number
of children that they want to have and to adopt responsible parenthood.

Last but not least, more egalitarian gender norms and attitudes need to be
established within society. Policies and programs that enhance girls' education,
and employment should be enforced while those that discriminate against
women should be abolished. Reduction of wanted and unwanted fertility can
only be achieved when women have the power to negotiate fertility desires with
their husbands and when society sees no difference in a couple having a son or a
daughter.

Dissemination Activities
Publications
A report that provides a full description of the SFT study methodology, findings and
programmatic implications has been disseminated to researchers and donors in
Egypt and the region. 8 In addition, a more condensed and simplified version of the
report that highlights key findings and programmatic implications, has been
produced and disseminated to a larger audience of program managers, researchers,
international organizations in Egypt. 9
For the main SFT study and each of the three in-depth analysis papers, a 2-4 page
Arabic policy brief was produced, presenting key findings of each study in a less
technical language and highlighting their programmatic implications. Policy briefs
are aimed at program managers and service providers who are not familiar with the
technical language and do not have the time to read the full report or the in-depth
analysis papers.

Dissemination Seminars
Two dissemination
seminars were held during
the course of the study
along with small briefing
meetings with senior
government officials. The
first seminar, which was
held in December 2004,
presented findings of the
main SFT study and was
attended by over 150
participants representing
MOHP undersecretaries
and program managers,
university staff, research
8 Casterline, J. and Roushdy, R. 2006. Slow Fertility Transition in Egypt: Main Report.
Cairo: Population Council.
9 Casterline, J. and Roushdy, R. 2006. Achieving Replacement-Level Fertility in Egypt: Challenges
and potential opportunities. Cairo: Population Council, FRONTIERS Program.

institutions, donor agencies and media professionals. A summary of presentations
and key recommendations that were made at this seminar are provided in this report.
The second dissemination seminar, which was held in July 2005, presented results of
the three in-depth analysis papers and derived relevant programmatic
recommendations. The seminar was attended by 50 participants representing
MOHP managers, media professionals and researchers. Following presentation of
findings participants were divided into working groups where they drew on the
presented findings to develop relevant programmatic recommendations.
Both seminars were covered by a number of local newspapers.
Utilization of Results
The above programmatic recommendations were developed in consultation with
senior policy officials at National Population Council and Ministry of Health and
Population. Some of the recommendations were used by NPC in formulating
Egypt's national population strategy for the next five years. Over the next six
months small meetings will be held with officials in the following ministries to
discuss mechanisms for utilization of the project results.
Ministry of Health and Population
- To review current premarital counseling protocols to encourage engaged and
newly married couples to plan for their lives, accept the two-child family norm
and delay the first pregnancy.
- Strengthen linkages between MCH and FP services to ensure inclusion of OBSI
messages within antenatal and postpartum care services;
Ministry of Information
- In collaboration with Communications for Healthy Living Project (USAID
funded project that provides TA to MOHP and Ministry of Information on
production of spots and IEC materials) FRONTIERS will recommend the
development of appropriate BCC messages that particularly target husbands with
messages like advantages of the two child family regardless of children's sex,
equal treatment for son and daughter, responsible parenthood ... etc.
Ministry of Education
- To review population education curricula for secondary school students to
include messages on responsible parenthood, gender equality, and optimal birth
spacing.
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INDEPTH ANALYSIS PAPER I

THE PATH TO REPLACEMENT-LEVEL FERTILITY IN
EGYPT: FERTILITY DESIRES AND FAMILY PLANNING
Laila O. El-Zeini
INTRODUCTION
Egyptian fertility has declined substantially during the last quarter of the twentieth
century. However, the current fertility level in Egypt is still well above the targeted
replacement level. Replacement fertility equals roughly an average of two children
per woman. In many countries, developed and developing, replacement fertility
takes place with many women having no children, delaying first births and/or having
one-child families. In the current Egyptian setting, favorably characterized by
universal and comparatively early marriage, replacement fertility is only achievable
if a large majority of couples actively seek to restrict their number of children to
two.
In spite of the rich information base on fertility and family planning in Egypt, little
is known about the attitude towards having two children only. The present study
aims at filling this information gap by addressing the following three specific
objectives.
Describe the attitude of Egyptian women towards limiting childbearing to two
children.
Investigate the factors associated with the preference for two children, and the
ability to achieve that preference.
Identify programmatic and policy options that can help speed up the Egyptian
fertility transition through encouraging women to aim at limiting their
childbearing to two children and enabling them to achieve this goal.

DATA AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This study uses data from SFT sample of married women. The analysis identifies a
group of women who have set to themselves a goal of having two children and are
actively working to achieve it, and then compare them to women who do not
embrace the norm of two-child family or who desire to limit their childbearing to
two children but fail to achieve this desire. The analysis, hence, addresses both the
demand and supply sides of fertility regulation and considers both wanted and
unwanted contributions to above-replacement fertility. The analysis puts more
emphasis on factors that are more amenable to policy intervention.
A conceptual framework with the acronym APA: Acceptance of the two-child ideal,
Preference for that ideal, and Achievement of such preference is used in this
analysis. The framework posits a hierarchical relationship among the three. It is
postulated that the first step in the path to replacement fertility is the acceptance of
the notion that it is beneficial to many couples to stop at two children. Strong
acceptance becomes an endorsement, or support, for the two-child family. In the
second step, couples move from the mere acceptance of the notion in general, as it
relates to others, to preferring it in their own life. Lastly, preference for the two-child
family is translated to actual achievement through effective use of family planning.
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As Figure 2.1 shows, couples could fail to start or to complete the APA path. Some
reject the notion of the two-child family, some, though accepting it, prefer to have
more than two children or are ambivalent, and some fail to achieve their desires to
stop at two children.
Figure 2.1: The APA framework: the path to achieving the two-child family and
distribution of married women according to place along the APA path

Accept
the twochild
family
ideal
(83%)

Reject
the twochild
family
ideal
(17%)

-

Prefer to
have two
children
(35%)
Indifferent
between
two and
three
(27%)
Prefer
more than
two (21%)

Achieve
the twochild
family
(19%)

Fail to
achieve
the twochild
family
(16%)

RESULTS
Figure 2.1 indicates that the majority of married Egyptian women accept the notion
of the two child family. Only one in every six respondents (17%) rejects that notion.
However, a large proportion of women prefer to have more than two children (21%)
or are ambivalent (27%). A little more than one third of respondents (35%) indicate
a decisive preference for two children only. These are divided, almost equally, into
achievers (19%) and non-achievers (16%). The distribution of women according to
achievement is inferred from the distribution of women who have already had the
risk of having a third child. Achievers are women with two living children whose
ideal number is two and are post-menopausal or are using contraceptives. Non
achievers are those whose ideal number of children is two but have already more
than two living, or are currently pregnant, or those with two living children but not
currently amenorrheic or not using contraception. The above suggests that only one
fifth of married women of reproductive age in Egypt have high potential for
stopping at two children.
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The three outcome variables of the conceptual framework (Accept, Prefer, and
Achieve) are measured using three composite indicators, each drawing on a large
number of questionnaire items. The acceptance variable distinguishes three
categories of women according to their attitude towards the two-child family norm:
rejecters, accepters, and supporters. The preference variable also distinguishes three
categories of women: those who prefer to have more than two children, those who
prefer to have two children at most, and those who are ambivalent. Both acceptance
and preference status could be assessed for all currently married women.
Achievement, in contrast, can only be assessed to a subgroup of women; those who
are (or have been) at risk of having an undesired third child. The constructed
achievement variable classifies those women into achievers and non-achievers.
Each of the three outcome variables is assumed to depend on groups of factors such
as: the cultural context, gender stratification values, economic stress and
expectations, perception of costs and benefits of children, and cost of fertility
regulation in its broad sense. An exploratory factor analysis is performed for each
group of items, excluding problematic items that show little internal validity. In
most instances, one factor accounting for roughly 40% to 65% of the total variance
of the items in each set is extracted and its estimated score used as a measure of the
underlying latent construct. Depending on the shape of the score distribution, the
score is divided into two or three categories of equal or different sizes, presenting
different levels of the underlying construct.
A set of regression models is fitted to SFT data to investigate the determinants of
each of the three outcome variables. Multinomial logistic regression models are
fitted for the acceptance of the two-child family and the preference for the two-child
family. A binomial logistic model is fitted for ability to achieve the two-child
family goal. The results of the regression analyses are presented in Tables 2.1-2.3:
Table 2.1 for acceptance, Table 2.2 for preference and Table 2.3 for achievement.
Main findings are summarized in the following subsections grouped by explanatory
variables 10. The hierarchical relationship among the three outcome variables is
confirmed by the findings. Support for the notion of the two-child family (in contrast
to mere acceptance), is the strongest determinant of preference (Table 2.2), while
preference for the two-child family (in contrast to ambivalence) is the strongest
determinant of achievement (Table 2.3).

Age, Contextual Factors and Socioeconomic Status
Controlling for other variables in each model, older women (35 +) are more likely to
reject the notion of the two-child family, to prefer having more than two children, or
to be ambivalent about their preference, while younger women are more likely to
accept, to prefer, and to achieve the two-child family. This relationship is not solely
a difference between older and younger women, but is largely affected by the fact
that older women have spent longer times at risk of having more than two children
and hence are more likely to have failed in stopping at two.
Some of the results discussed in the text refer to effects when intervening variables are excluded
from the model. These effects are not shown in the tables, which show only net effects from the full
equation. The text is explicit about the type of effect discussed.
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Residence in Upper Egypt is strongly associated with a higher probability of
rejecting the notion of the two-child family and, when accepting it, to prefer having
more than two children or to be ambivalent. However, among those who accept the
two-child family norm and indicate some preference toward it, residence in Upper
Egypt is not an obstacle to achieving a two-child family.
Other indicators of the cultural context are also related to the likelihood of women's
attitude towards the two-child family. In particular, perception of community and
religious support for family planning and perception of one's control over
childbearing reduce the likelihood of rejecting the notion of the two child family.
Exposure to positive family planning messages is also related to higher acceptance
of the two-child family, but its influence is channeled through perception of costs
and benefits of children, leaving its net effect statistically insignificant when these
factors are included in the model.

Gender Stratification and Gender Role Values
While a woman's role in decision-making does not predict her attitude towards the
two-child family, it is a significant determinant of the likelihood of achieving the
two child goal. Gender values are significantly related to acceptance and preference,
but not to achievement. Women expressing more egalitarian values are more likely
to accept and to prefer a two-child family, but a large part of the effect of gender
attitudes works through perceived costs and benefits of children.
Unexpectedly, working women are significantly more likely to reject the notion of
the two-child family. On the other hand, given acceptance, working women are less
likely to prefer more than two children.

Economic Stress and Economic Expectations
Living under economic stress, as measured in this paper, does not significantly
affect the probability of rejecting the two-child family or preferring it (Tables 2.1 &
2.2). However, women indicating high economic stress seem to be more likely to
support the notion of having two children.
On the other hand, optimistic economic expectations, either for self or for children,
seem to result in a higher likelihood of rejecting the notion of the two child family.
Women who have a positive outlook regarding their economic prospects are also
less likely to have a decisive preference for two children (Table 2.2). This finding is
somewhat alarming as it indicates that acceptance of the two-child family in Egypt
could be, at least to some extent, a result of a pessimistic view of the economic
prospects.

Costs and Benefits of Children
Consistent with the economic framework of fertility determinants, perception of low
costs and high benefits considerably lowers the likelihood of accepting the notion of
the two-child family. The actual costs of childrearing, on the other hand, are not
significantly related to the probability of accepting the two-child family.
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Women who do not consider their actual childrearing costs burdensome are less
likely to be ambivalent about their childbearing preferences. Curiously, actual and
perceived costs of childrearing are correlated with a lower probability of achieving
the two-child family goals. This could be attributed, at least partially, to a situation
in which women failing to limit their childbearing, and hence have many children,
are more acutely aware of the high costs.

Costs of Fertility Regulation
Some measures of the costs of regulation are found to be significantly related to the
preference for two children, including inter-spousal agreement and communication
and fear of negative effects of family planning on breastfeeding and on health. Interspousal communication, a factor hypothesized to facilitate women's adoption of
family planning, has the effect of strengthening women's preference and reducing
ambivalence. Such impact of communication is evident among women who prefer
two children as well as those who prefer more than two. Interestingly, inter-spousal
agreement is associated with a higher probability of preferring more than two
children.
Women who are less concerned about the side effects of contraceptive methods are
significantly more likely to be definite in their preference for the two-child family.
On the positive side, strong perception of negative health side effects of family
planning is not a significant barrier to adoption of family planning among those
motivated to limit their childbearing to two children.

Sex Preference
As speculated, strong sex preference is a major determinant of the propensity to
reject the two-child family, of preference for having more than two children or
ambivalence about having two or three children. In addition, sex preference stands
out as a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-child family. The odds of
achievement of the two child goal are among those with strong sex preference are
almost six times lower than the odds among women with weak sex preference.
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Table 2.1: Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis for acceptance of the two-child
family (reference category: acceptance), Egypt SFT 2004
Explanatory Variables

Reference category

Age (at EIDHS)
Younger than 35
Region
Urban governorates
Lower Egypt
Exposure to family planning messages
Strong
Moderate
Community support for family planning
High
Perception of control over childbearing
High
Moderate
Socioeconomic status
Low
Medium
Wife employment
Working
Wife participation in decision making
Always
Sometimes
Wife mobility
High
Moderate
Gender values
Weak discrimination
Moderate discrimination
Economic stress and expectation
Economic stress
Low
Moderate
Economic expectation for self
Optimistic
Neutral
Economic expectation for children
Optimistic
Neutral
Sex preference
Strong
Cost and benefit of children
Actual cost
Low
Medium
Perceived cost
Low
Medium
Perception of benefit
Weak
Moderate
Old age co-residence with children
Neither prefers nor expects
Either prefers or expects

Odds ratios
Support
Rejection

35 or older
Upper Egypt

0.663"

1.213"

0.430*"
0.350*"

0.852
1 .784***

0.864
0.673

1.399
1.455

0.651"

0.954

0.427***

1 .324"

0.707*

0.913

1.607*

0.709*

1.369"

0.954

1.617"*

1.120

0.802
0.695

1.164
0.836

1.134
1.065

1.578
1.685*

0.658*

1.297
1.145

Weak
Low
Low

High
Not working
Rarely

Restricted

Strong discrimination

0.677*
High
0.936
1.129
Pessimistic

2.095"
1 .474*

Pessimistic
1.179
0.894
Weak

2.94*"

High
0.926
1.096
High
Strong

Prefers and expects

~p value < 0.1
*p value < 0.05
**p value < 0.005 ***p value < 0.0005
Reference category: acceptance of the two-child family
Number of cases = 3286
Pseudo R square in the final model = 0.50

16

0.677"
0.636*
0.835
0.818
0.798"
1.136
0.78"
0.722"
1.003

5.614"*
2.066"*

0.003"*
0.547***

0.124***
0.207*"

20.356*"
7.528***

0.605**

2.671"

0.920

0.903

Table 2.2: Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis for preference for the twochild family, Egypt SFT 2004
Reference
category
35 or older

Explanatory Variables
Age (at EIDHS)
Younger than 35
Region
Urban governorates
Lower Egypt
Exposure to family planning messages
Strong
Moderate
Community support for family planning
High
Perception of control over childbearing
High
Moderate
Socioeconomic status
Low
Medium
Wife employment
Working
Wife participation in decision making
Always
Sometimes
Wife mobility
High
Moderate

Upper Egypt
Weak

Sex preference
Strong
Cost and benefit of children
Actual cost
Low
Medium
Perceived cost
Low
Medium
Perception of benefit
Weak
Moderate
Old age co-residence with children
Neither prefers nor expects
Either prefers of expects
Acceptance of the two-child family
Support
Agreement with husband

0.619***

0.593 ***

0.434 ***
0.457 ***

0.625 **
0.681 **

1.995*
2.056 **

1.290
1.256

1.124

1.095

0.843
1.024

0.678 *

Low
Low
High

0.758 "

0.890

0.881

0.872
0.969

0.745 *

0.821 ~

1.509
1.102

0.661
1.152

0.617
0.810

1.366
0.876

0.704 *

0.726 *

0.783

0.943

0.803
0.905

0.905
0.967

1.358
1.131

1 .442 *
1.204

1.202
1.141
Odds ratios
Prefers > 2

1.071
0.922
Ambivalent

1 .9 ***

1.53***

0.740
0.894

0.405 ***

0.777
1.117

0.595 **

1 .634 **

2.042 ***
1.897***

Not working
Rarely
Restricted
Strong
discrimination

Gender values
Weak discrimination
Moderate discrimination
Economic stress and expectation
Economic stress
Low
Moderate
Economic expectation for self
Optimistic
Neutral
Economic expectation for children
Optimistic
Neutral
Explanatory Variables

Odds ratios
Ambivalent
Prefers > 2

High
Pessimistic
Pessimistic
Reference category
Weak
High
High
Strong

1.219

0.817

0.867

Prefers & expects
Accept

0.994
0.634 *

0.924
1.054

0.380 ***

0.557 ***

1.515**

1.030

Low

High
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Table 2.2: Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis for preference for the twochild family, Egypt SFT 2004 (Continued)
Reference
category
Low

Explanatory Variables
Communication with husband
High
Fear of negative effect on fecundity
Low
Moderate
Fear of negative effect on breastfeeding
Low
Moderate
Fear of side effects
Low
Moderate

Odds ratios
Prefers > 2
Ambivalent
1.128

0.794 *

0.969
0.820

1.192
1.005

High
High
0.820
0.868

High

0.696 *
0.693 *

~ p value < 0.1
*p value < 0.05
** p value < 0.005 *** p value < 0.0005
Reference category: sure to prefer two children
Pseudo R2 = 0.16
n = 2604 (excluding women classified as rejecting the two-child family)
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0.712"
0.824 "
0.511 *"
0.577 ***

Table 2.3: Results of binomial logistic regression analysis for achievement of the twochild family, Egypt SFT 2004
Reference category
35 or older

Explanatory Variables
Age (at EIDHS)
Younger than 35
Region
Urban governorates
Lower Egypt
Exposure to family planning messages
Strong
Moderate
Community support for family planning
High
Perception of control over childbearing
High
Moderate
Socioeconomic status
Low
Medium
Wife employment
Working
Wife participation in decision making
Always
Sometimes
Wife mobility
High
Moderate
Gender values
Weak discrimination
Moderate discrimination
Economic stress
Low
Moderate

Upper Egypt

Odds ratios
5.359"*
1.903*
1.222

Weak

0.381*
0.414*

Low
0.955
Low
1.173
0.709
High

0.293***
0.707

Not working
1.175

Rarely

5.691*
1.485

Restricted

0.122**
0.475

Strong discrimination
1.189
1.125

High
0.796
1.416

Economic expectation for self

Pessimistic

Optimistic
Neutral
Economic expectation for children
Optimistic
Neutral
Sex preference
Strong
Explanatory Variables
Cost and benefit of children
Actual cost
Low
Medium
Perceived cost
Low
Medium
Perception of benefit
Weak
Moderate
Old age co-residence with children
Neither prefers nor expects
Either prefers of expects

0.774
0.777

Pessimistic

0.636"
0.942

Weak
Reference category
High

0.17"*

Odds ratios
3.654"
3.018"*

High
1.660
1.779*
Strong
0.822
0.402"
Prefers & expects
1.547
1.121

Acceptance of the two-child family

Accept

Support
Preference for the two-child family
Indecisive
Agreement with husband
High
Communication with husband
High

1 .654*
Sure

0.025***

Low
1.041
Low
0.967
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Table 2.3: Results of binomial logistic regression analysis for achievement of the twochild family, Egypt SFT 2004 (continued)
Explanatory Variables
Reference category
Odds ratios
Fear of negative effect on fecundity
Low
Moderate
Fear of negative effect on breastfeeding
Low
Moderate
Fear of side effects
Low
Moderate

High

0.609~
0.522*

High
0.614
1.171

High
1.184
1.310

~p value < 0.1
*p value < 0.05
**p value < 0.005
***p value < 0.0005
Reference category: failing to achieve the two-child family
Pseudo R2 = 0.53
n = 915 (excluding women with less than 2 children and women with more than two children whose
idea number of children not equal two and women classified as sure not to prefer a two-child family)

POLICY AND PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS
The results presented above identify three groups of women who need to be targeted
by the Egyptian government in order to achieve replacement level fertility by 2017.
Women in the above three groups can be termed 'missed clients', 'the ambivalent',
and 'the iron guards'.
The first group; the missed clients, represent about one sixth of married women of
reproductive age. These are women who are willing to stop at two children but are
not using contraceptives because they do not consider that they have a great need to
practice family planning or because they are afraid to use family planning methods.
This includes older women of lower socio-economic status, women who have little
control over decision-making and who have strong son preference. This group of
women does not contribute much to the national level of fertility, though they
constitute a significant portion of women with unmet need and produce a
disproportionate share of unwanted fertility. For those women, the answer resides in
extending available choices of family planning methods to accommodate their
specific needs. Specifically, family planning services have to go beyond coitusindependent long-term contraceptives that typically pose heavy health burden on
women. Moreover, the importance of adequate counseling to alleviate those
women's fears about side-effects of contraceptive methods can not be
overemphasized. Counseling should also empower those women to be able to
negotiate with their husbands. Raedat Rifyat (rural outreach personnel) could play a
major role in bringing those women to health services and in ensuring consistent use
of contraception.
Ambivalent women represent a stronger challenge to program designers. They
constitute slightly more than one quarter (27%) of married women of reproductive
age". They tend to be older (35 +) and to live in Upper Egypt They tend to embrace
more patriarchal gender values, strong son preference and little communication with
husband about childbearing goals. They also tend to have more optimistic economic
1 ' This proportion could increase to almost half of currently married women (48%) if one includes
women who, though not rejecting the notion of the two-child family, state a definite desire to have
more than two children. These women share many of the characteristics of ambivalent women and
can be addressed using similar approaches.
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outlook for themselves and their children but strong concerns about method sideeffects. The above results suggest some policy avenues for dealing with ambivalence
and strengthening women's attachment to the two-child ideal. Encouraging interspousal communication, ensuring husband support for family planning and
addressing concerns about the side effects of contraceptives are three near-term
avenues. In the long term, a key approach is promoting more egalitarian gender
values, which, among other benefits, could lead to a weakening of son preference.
In considering the problem of ambivalence, a point to keep in mind is that optimistic
economic expectations could result in an increase in desired fertility. In order to
mitigate this potential effect, it should be stressed that economic prosperity cannot
be sustained without a check on the number of children. Providing women with new
channels for self-actualization and economic independence could both weaken son
preference and disentangle economic security from reproduction. Institutional
changes that promote parenting values, such as the importance of children receiving
higher education; that increase child costs and decrease the immediate benefits from
child work would also have the impact of strengthening the motivation for having
only two children.
The third and last group consists of women who are positively against the notion of
the two-child family - the iron guards (17% of married women of reproductive age).
This group poses a double threat to the program, first by contributing more children
and by influencing others who are ambivalent about the notion of two children.
Institutional factors that amplify the benefits of children in relation to their costs
provide a main explanation for the existence of this pronatalist attitude. In addition,
there appears to be a purely cultural aspect to the aversion to the idea of limiting
childbearing to two, or even to a number above two. The iron guards identified
within the SFT sample tend to believe that couples have no control over their
childbearing, to perceive low support among religious leaders to the idea of birth
control, and to be least exposed to positive family planning messages. Not
surprisingly, this hard-core group is mainly found in Upper Egypt where both
institutional and cultural forces work against the idea of birth control. Strategies for
changing these two, largely interweaved, forces are needed to overcome this last
forte of opposition to replacement-level fertility in Egypt.
Possible avenues to address obstacles to achieving replacement fertility are
summarized below. They are grouped according to the mode and level of
intervention intro three groups: interventions through family planning services;
communication and mass media; and long-term policy directions.

Family Planning Services
Expand contraceptive choices. The Egyptian family planning program should
introduce methods that pose lower health burden; that are more convenient to
use and are coitus dependent. Barrier methods (such as spermicides and
diaphragm), emergency contraceptive pills and fertility awareness methods
should be more widely available in MOHP clinics.
Stress quality counseling. Counseling is a main avenue for addressing some of
the identified obstacles. Issues that need to be stressed through counseling
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include: concerns about side effects of contraceptives; methods appropriate for
couples with sparse exposure; value of inter-spousal communication; ways to
handle opposition from spouse, community and from religious figures.
Proper management of side-effects. Providers need adequate training on
management of side-effects. They should be able to help clients distinguish
between side-effects that are temporary and those that require immediate
medical attention.

Mass Media, School Curricula and Face-to-Face Communication
Present the two-child family as the ideal and the three-child family as a large
family. The recent shift from three to two as the number of children in the ideal
family should be stressed. A three-child family should be demonstrated as a
large family in order to stress the difference between two and three children.
Address the sex composition issue. The two-child family presented as an ideal
should be depicted sometimes as a two-girl family and sometimes as a two-boy
family, in addition to the stereotype of a boy and a girl. A focus on a two-girl
family to the exclusion of other types should be avoided in order not to convey a
biased connotation to the two-child family.
Promote more egalitarian gender attitudes. Egalitarian gender values seem to be
a facilitating condition to the acceptance of the two-child family. Unfortunately,
mass media and school curricula tend to reinforce gender stratification through
taking traditional gender role divisions as granted and unchangeable.
Attentiveness to these gender biases in the public discourse is a precondition for
real changes in values.
Eliminate bias against the one-child family. One obstacle to accepting a twochild family as an ideal might be the emphasis on two children as the minimum
acceptable size. A positive representation of one-child families could facilitate
accepting two as a maximum number. A positive representation does not mean
the promotion of one-child families as ideal, but rather presenting it as a viable
and acceptable choice.
Encourage husband involvement in family planning. Promote husband-wife
communication about fertility plans and encourage husbands to share
responsibility in family planning and in childrearing.
Stress the quantity-quality trade-off and the concept of responsible parenthood.
The view of quality child-rearing as a costly endeavor should be emphasized.
The costs of quality childrearing in terms of money, health and time should be
highlighted.

Far-reaching Policy Directions
Address the benefits of children. Providing non-familial channels for old-age
security, especially for women, is essential to facilitate the acceptance of the
two-child family. Policies and programs directed to fighting child labor also help
disentangle childbearing from economic security. People who have more access
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to non-familial channels for self-actualization and social security are more likely
to accept the notion of restricting their childbearing to two children.
Address the costs of children. Cost of childrearing would increase in response to
two kinds of job-creating policies, the first encourages women employment and
the other improves employment opportunities for youths with quality education.
Women employment raises the opportunity cost of the time spent in birth and
childrearing. Policies that raise returns to higher and costly education
concurrently increase the cost of proper childrearing and encourage the quantityquality tradeoff.
Encouraging girls' education and women employment are important vehicles for
change. However, an egalitarian system is not achievable without addressing
gender biases in school curricula and mass media. Empowerment of girls and
women is the key for real changes. Examples of policies and interventions for
empowering women include leadership opportunities for women, micro-credit
programs, and participatory approaches to women's capacity building such as
women's clubs.
Encourage participatory developmental interventions, especially in Upper Egypt.
For such interventions to be effective, they should emphasize socio-cultural in
addition to economic changes. Active participation is the only guarantee for
gaining support of community and religious leaders. Participation also promotes
a sense of individual control. A perception of lack of control over childbearing is
only one manifestation of a generalized lack of control over one's life.
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INDEPTH ANALYSIS PAPER II

CHILDBEARING AND CONTRACEPTIVE ATTITUDES
AMONG UNMARRIED YOUTH

Laila Nawar
BACKGROUND
Egypt's National Population Policy calls for reducing the rate of population growth.
The target is to achieve a replacement level fertility (TFR=2.1) by the year 2017.
However, recent fertility trends in Egypt indicate that fertility decline noted in 1980s
and early 1990s has slowed down during the latter part of the 1990s. Additionally,
TFR is recently estimated at 3.2 by the 2003 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health
Survey (EIDHS), which is one birth above replacement level.
Despite the numerous studies conducted in Egypt in the past few years on youth
attitudes to childbearing and reproductive health, the present study is unique in
exploring childbearing attitudes more intensively among never married men and
women. This stems from realizing the importance of studying youth attitudes to
childbearing at an early stage before translating them into practice. This is
particularly important when considering prospects of further fertility decline in the
future.

STUDY OBJECTIVES
This study has two main objectives:
To investigate childbearing and family planning attitudes among never married
men and women and identify the groups who are more motivated than others to
adopt the two- child family
To propose programmatic recommendations that could assist the Egyptian FP
programs to achieve further reductions in fertility.

THE DATA AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY
GROUPS
Data used in this paper relate to never married men and women in the age range 1829 collected through the Slow Fertility Transition (SFT) study conducted by the
Population Council and Cairo Demographic Center in 2004. Data came from a
national sample in coverage, which was drawn from all EIDHS households, not only
those including an EIDHS respondent, yielding a sample of 953 and 909 never
married men and women, respectively.

KEY FINDINGS
Participants' Characteristics
Most of the never married men and women fall in the age range 20-24 (about onehalf). Significant differences are noted among men and women by education and
working status. Young women are more educated than men; about 36 percent
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attained university education or higher compared to about 27 percent of men. About
65 percent of young men work for cash, compared to only 28 percent among
women. Because of younger ages at marriage of females, more women reported that
they were engaged (37%) compared to men (17%).

Attitudes towards Marriage
More women than men have already completed some steps towards marriage; given
the earlier ages of their marriage (about 30% verses 15% among males). What is
striking about this data is that engaged young men (or those who went through
contract of marriage) reported on average 2.5 years waiting time since these events,
and at least some of them have to wait longer before moving to matrimony. Also,
the data reveals that both unmarried men and women express preferred ages at
marriage for themselves that are higher than preferred ages at marriage for other
adults of same sex. This may reflect perceived difficult economic conditions for
themselves and their aspirations to marry earlier, which bears important implications
for subsequent analysis on childbearing attitudes.
Many studies conducted in Egypt have revealed that Egyptians place high value on
marriage. All but very small proportions of young women have been married by the
end of their childbearing years. The situation for men is not different. The data
reveals that both young men and women attach great importance to marriage.
However, there is evidence of emerging change among women. A larger proportion
of women (37%) indicated that it would be alright if they never marry, compared to
only 22 percent of men. These data, in fact, support the conviction that when women
report views that deviate from the norm, this represents important information about
diversity among women and emergence of changing attitudes. However, it must be
made clear that those data do not reflect a preference not to marry, rather, an
indication that not marrying would not be a problem.

Desired Family Size
Overall women tend to desire fewer children than men. The most common preferred
number of children is two children (51% of men and 58% of women). Nevertheless,
about 34 percent of men and 30 percent of women prefer to have three children, and
around one-tenth of each group desire four or more children.
The data also revealed a weak attachment to the expressed number of desired
children among both men and women. However, as clear from Table (3.1), both
men and women express more concern about the possibility of their actual number
of children exceeding their ideal by one child than the possibility of falling one child
short of their ideal. About 34 percent of men and 35 percent of women reported that
it would matter a great deal if they have one more child than desired, whereas about
10 percent of men and 15 percent of women reported that it would matter a great
deal if they have one less child than desired. It is noteworthy however, that more
than one third of unmarried men and women (39% of men and 44% of women)
think that it would not matter at all to have one more child than desired.
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Table 3.1: Youth attachment to fertility desires6
Men

Degree of attachment
- If you have one more child than desired number,
would it make difference?*
Yes, great deal
Yes, little
Not at all
Total number
- If you have one less child than desired number, would
it make difference? **
Yes, great deal
Yes, little
Not at all
Total number

Women

%

N

%

N

34
27
39
100

312
245
362
919

35
21
44
100

312
191
396
899

10
22
68
100

95
198
627
920

15
13
72
100

137
118
644
899

B persons who did not report numeric answer to the question on desired no. of children are not
included
*Differences between males and females are statistically significant (p < 0.05)
"Differences between males and females are statistically significant (p < 0.01)

Advantages and Disadvantages of Two-Child Family
Overwhelming percentages of both men and women agreed to statements describing
the benefits of the two-child family, including more benefits for the children (better
education, health care and better standard of living) and more benefits for the family
(better living conditions and less crowded and happier household). Also, almost all
women and all men (with a few exceptions) agreed that the two-child family
provides better opportunities for mothers to invest their time in doing activities they
like to do. On the other hand, very few men and women agreed with statements
describing disadvantages of the two-child family. These disadvantages included less
benefit for the family as a result of having only two children, such as: receiving less
help from children with household shores, less contribution from children to
household income, insufficient support in old age, losing the feeling of having a
strong family, and the risk of not having enough children surviving to adulthood.
Those respondents who agreed with more than one statement about the advantages
of the two-child family (99% of men and women) were asked to specify the most
important advantage. Men and women agreed on three most important advantages,
which are: better household-living conditions; children can be raised more properly,
and more schooling could be secured for children. Taken together, those three
advantages were reported by about 83 percent of men and about 72 percent of
women. On the other hand about 12% of men and 14% of women reported more
than one disadvantage. Among men, the most important three disadvantages were
losing the feeling of having happier / stronger family (36%), not having enough
sons/ daughters (16%) and the family name will be weakened (13%). And among
women, the top three disadvantages were not having enough sons / daughters (23%),
not enough support received in old age (17%), and losing the feeling of happier /
stronger family (16%).

Desired Fertility by Selected Background Characteristics
Table (3.2) shows desired number of children by selected background characteristics
of never married men and women. Age of young men and women does not show a
systematic association with the desired number of children. Significant differences
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exist in the desired number of children by rural/ urban residence as well as place of
residence. The desire to have two children or less is clearly higher among urban
residents; and lowest among men and women residing in Upper Egypt in
comparison to those residing in the Urban and Lower Egypt governorates.
Table 3.2: Percent of unmarried youth who desire two children or less by selected
background characteristics
Selected Characteristics

Age
<20
20-24
25-29
Educational status"
Below secondary
Secondary to below university
University and over
Working status
Work for cash
Not working + family work
Residence
Urban
Rural
Place of residence
Urban governorates
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt
No. of brothers and sisters
2 or less
3
4 and more
Engaged"
Yes
No

Men
% desire 2 or
Less

N

54
52
56

294
455
204

52
54
54

177
501
253

55
52

554
399

62"

476
478

46
64"

236
388
329

53
47
55"

181
195
577

62
50
64"

160
792

52

Women
% desire 2 or
Less
63"
57
62
67'

N

335
446
128

63
54

130
404
297

62
59

238
671

65"
53
67"
62
52
66'
62
57
64'
58

493
416
219
373
317
171
196
542
284
625

A persons who never went to school not included (22 men and 77 women)
B includes contract of marriage, engaged, Fatha and marriage proposal
Note: For any background characteristic shown, and with regard to each sex (men or women
separately), the difference between the proportion of those who desire 2 or less children and those who
desire 3 or more is tested. The presence of (*) indicates that the difference is statistically significant at P

< 0.05, and the presence of (**) indicates that the difference is statistically significant at P < 0.01.

Employment status working for cash versus not working or only work for the
household does not seem to be associated with preferences for two children,
among either men or women. The association between level of education attained
and desired number of children poses a puzzle, especially among women. The
higher the level of education attained, the lower the percent of women who desire
only two children. Among men, there appears to be no significant association
between educational attainment and the desire to have two children. There is a
significant association between number of children desired among females and
number of siblings. Women tend to desire a number of children similar/close to their
number of siblings. The higher the number of siblings, the higher fertility desires.
Finally, the last panel of Table (3.2) shows that being engaged is strongly associated
with the desire to have two children only, both among men and women.
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Desired Fertility by Selected Socio-Cultural Attitudes
Childbearing attitudes, especially among younger cohorts, are influenced by changes
taking place in the social context within which they live, both at the family and the
community levels. Five composite indices have been construed in this paper to test
their correlation with childbearing and family planning attitudes of unmarried men
and women. Those indices are: (1) Index of women's autonomy, (2) Index of
economic stress, (3) Index of social change, (4) Index of perceived community
support, and (5) Index of gender role and attitudes. A brief description of each index
is given in the Annex.
Table 3.3: Percent of never married men and women who desire two children or less
by selected socio-cultural attitudes
Indices

Perceived community support
High
Low
Acceptance of social change
High
Medium
Low
Perceived Economic Stress
High
Medium
Low
Acceptance of egalitarian gender
roles and attitudes
High
Low
Achievement of Women's
autonomy12
High
Medium
Low

Men
% desire 2 or
Less

N

52
56

657
296

5/
52
43

447
383
123

60"
47
55

57*
52

236
297
425

344
610

Women
% desire 2 or
Less
60
59
67"

N

681
228

56
51

371
448
91

65
58
57

275
182
453

65'
57
69"
64
55

348
561

142
286
481

Note: For any index shown, and with regard to each sex (men and women separately), the difference
between the proportion of those who desire 2 children or less and those who desire three or more is
tested. The presence of (*) indicates that the difference is statistically significant at P<0.05, and the
presence of (**) indicates that the difference is statistically significant at P<0.01.

Table (3.3) shows that desiring two children goes systematically in the expected
direction with achieving higher levels of women's autonomy, with adopting
modernized norms and lifestyles within emerging aspects of social change, and also
with attaching to favorable gender roles and attitudes. Men and women who ranked
highest on the economic stress index, i.e. who reported more difficult living
conditions, were more likely to desire two children. Interestingly, some lack of
association is noted between desire for two children or less and perceived
community support of family planning.

12 Attitudes towards women's autonomy were not measured among men in the sample
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Attitudes about Family Planning
The majority of unmarried men and women (about four-fifths) reported previous
exposure to media messages on family planning. However, about one-fourth of both
groups still think that couples cannot control the number of children they reproduce.
This suggests that media messages should take a different twist to tackle such
misconceptions. The data reflects a strong community support of family planning.
The majority of both men and women reported that most of friends and neighbors in
their localities agree to family planning use (80.2% of men and 93.8% of women),
and that religious leaders in their localities do not think that family planning use is
against religion (87% of men and 81% of women) and do not encourage people to
have many children (91% of men and 84.8% of women).
Almost all men and women agreed that repeated pregnancies cause more health
problems for women than using family planning. Also, it is interesting that about
one-half of both men and women agreed that a woman could use a family planning
method despite her husband disapproval, if pregnancy would pose a risk to her
health. This is indeed a new emerging attitude among new generations which
contrasts with findings of research conducted one or two decades ago which showed
public disapproval of women's use of family planning methods without their
husband's knowledge, regardless of the reason.
Most of young men and women oppose the notion of delaying first pregnancy and
prefer to have it sooner after marriage. Men were more likely to accept this issue
(41%) compared to women (30%). Furthermore, the majority of those who accepted
delaying first pregnancy reported preference to delay it for a maximum of 12 months
(62% of men and 80% of women). Finally, only about two-fifths of engaged men
and women reported that they discuss desired number of children with their
marriage partners. This reflects a clear lack of planning of future fertility goals
among youth.

POLICY AND PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS
Findings indicated by the study that a substantial fraction of both never married
men and women still considers three children or more as desirable represent a
challenge to achieving replacement- level fertility goal.
Mass media should have a critical role in advocating the culture of two-child
family- irrespective of the sex of the children- and also in creating commitment
to it. This requires highlighting benefits of the small family that relate to the
household, to the children and also potential benefits for women's lives.
Specifically, messages should highlight those advantages reported by majority of
young men and women, i.e. better household living conditions, children can be
raised more properly and better schooling for them. Disadvantages of small
families more frequently mentioned also need to be counteracted, namely losing
feeling of happier / stronger family, having not enough sons/ daughters and
having not enough support in old age. Media messages should also explain to
couples that they can control the number of children that they have through use
of FP methods.
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Behavior change professionals should involve key religious leaders, who receive
wide acceptance among the Egyptian public, in designing messages that promote
the two- child family. Also, indirect messages that are conveyed through drama
and most popular TV and radio programs should be highlighted and should
receive due attention.
Participants who scored high on indices of women's autonomy, social change
and egalitarian gender roles were more likely to desire two children. Attention
should be given to youth development programs that focus on developing life
options and skills, promoting educational aspirations, vocational training and
psychosocial development, which have been shown to be helpful in promoting
healthy lifestyle for youth. Drawing upon the existing programs of this type and
expanding their coverage would help reinforce modernized and more egalitarian
gender attitudes and beliefs.
Youth centers should also be targeted to contribute some input in achieving
wider acceptance of two- child family. There is a large network of youth centers
in Egypt, with wide geographic coverage. In addition to recreational, educational
and other components provided in a youth- friendly setting, a special component
on favorable childbearing patterns has been recently introduced for pilot testing
in a small number of these centers. Scaling- up of this component might follow,
in case of documenting its positive effect on achieving wider acceptance of the
two-child family.
It is important to involve young adults in youth policy dialogue and
programming. They can provide useful information on their own needs and
preferences, as well as explanation and interpretations of many of the observed
patterns of youth attitudes and behaviors related to childbearing. This will make
it easier for policy makers and program managers to think of appropriate designs
of youth programs that help reinforce commitment to two-child family.
For a long time in Egypt, school programs have included population and
reproductive health curricula. It is important to continuously update and review
this component. It should also be re-structured as to create strong sense of
responsibility, especially parenthood responsibility and to promote more
egalitarian gender attitudes. Curricula should also help strengthen skills on how
to make proper choices for one's life, and how to effectively achieve individuals'
desires, including fertility desires.
There is a long lead time for engaged men and women to complete marriage
preparations. IEC programs should encourage couples to seek premarital
counseling during that period. Meanwhile adequate premarital counseling
services should be made available and accessible to youth. Through existing
government and NGOs clinics. Messages given to couples during premarital
counseling should emphasize benefits of delaying first pregnancy, responsible
parenting, importance of husband-wife communication in areas related to
deciding on family size, and advantages of the two-child family.
The significant finding reflected by the study on opposition of most of men and
women of delaying first pregnancy indicate that it is unlikely that delaying first
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pregnancy will gain wider acceptance in the short run, especially with the trend
towards higher age at marriage of females.
Mass media should encourage newly married couples to delay first pregnancy and
should help in dispelling misconceptions about effects of family planning methods
on future fertility. More importantly, however, medical professionals should be
approached through training programs, seminars, print materials .. ..etc. to update
their knowledge on FP most suitable for nulliparous women and to improve their
attitudes regarding delaying first pregnancy.
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ANNEX
Description of the Constructed Indices
Index of Women's Autonomy
The construction of this index was mainly based on an earlier work developed by
Nawar, Lloyd and Ibrahim (1995) 13 , which gave close attention to the particular
social and cultural context in which women's personal autonomy is expressed.
Indicators used in constructing this index are presented in the following table. The
value of the index ranges between 0 to 5.
Indicators used in constructing the women's autonomy index
- Currently working
Think that a girl should choose her spouse, not the family or jointly with
the family_________________________________
- Think that a woman should work after marriage
Think that couples could have control over number of children they want
to reproduce________________________________
Think that if a woman's health would be at high risk if she gets pregnant
and her husband disapprove family planning, she should use a
contraceptive method without informing him_______________

Index of Economic Stress
The SFT questionnaire of unmarried men and women included questions on the
actual circumstances of their household economics. This included 1 1 items that
indirectly measure the financial status of the household. The score on that index
ranges between 0 and 11.
Indicators used in constructing the economic stress index
- Think that household income not enough to cover basic needs
Think that current household income is equal to, little below or far below
minimum income level that could meet household basic needs
Think that household standard of living this year is worse than last year
- Eats meat, fish or chicken twice a week or less_____________
- Household owes money to others
Last month household had difficulty in meeting the following expenses
- Food and other daily needs
- Rent
- Adult medical expenses
- Children health care
- Education fees of children
- Paying credit / loans__________________________

Index of Social Change
The SFT questionnaire included some aspects of social change underway in
Egyptian society, including changes in division of labor and gender roles within the
family. Never married men and women were asked if they support/favor these
13

Nawar, Laila, Cynthia B.Lloyd and Barbara Ibrahim, 1995 "Gender Roles and Decision Making in
Egyptian Families" In Family. Gender and Population in the Middle East: Policies in Context Carla
M. Obermeyer (ed), AUC Publications, Cairo 1995.
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changes. The index of social change included 7 items, with a minimum value of 0
and a maximum value of 7.
Indicators used in constructing the social change index
- Agree that it is good idea if new weds postpone first pregnancy
- Think that a person should not live with his children in old age
It is very important that boys should be trained to help out with household
shores
Agrees with emerging changes taking place recently to Egyptian families
- Husbands help out with household shores
- Parents have less influence on decisions made by children
- Increasing numbers of women who occupy leading positions in society
- Women are increasingly participating in family decision making_____

Index of Perceived Community Support of Family Planning
The unmarried men and women questionnaire included three questions on perceived
acceptance of friends, neighbors and religious leaders in the respondent's locality to
family planning. The index includes three items and summation score on that index
ranges between 0 and 3.
Indicators used in constructing the community support index
- Most friends and neighbors agree to family planning use
- Religious leaders in locality don't think that family planning is against
religion______________________________________
- Religious leaders in locality don't encourage people to have many
children

Index of Gender Roles and Attitudes
The International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) Plan of
Action (POA) stated that the full participation and partnership of both men and
women is required in productive and reproductive life, including shared
responsibilities for the care and nurturing of children and maintenance of the
household. The objective is to achieve equality and equity between men and women
and to enable women to realize their full potential. The selection of the items of the
index of gender roles and attitudes was based on these guidelines. The constructed
index is composed of 12 items and its value ranges between 0 and 12.
Indicators used in constructing the gender role index
- A woman should be able to work if she likes to
Think that a girl should choose her spouse, not the family and not the girl
and the family__________________________________
- If a couple have three girls, should not try for a son
- Men and women could do same work
Agree that women's place is not only home and should be allowed to
work outside home
If the wife works outside home, husband should help with child care____
Disagree that a thirty year old woman who has a good job but is not yet
married is to be pitied______________________________
Disagree that husband has the right to beat his wife if:
- She neglects the children
- She argues / speaks loudly to him
- Talks to men outside family circle
- She spends a lot of money / wastes his money
- She refuses sex
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INDEPTH ANALYSIS PAPER III

PROFILE OF BIRTH SPACING IN EGYPT
Hassan H.M. Zaky
BACKGROUND
Child-spacing patterns have received relatively less attention in the literature, even
though differences in the timing of births may well be among the most important
aspects of fertility differentials in societies undergoing their fertility transition. The
average birth interval according to the 2003 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health
Survey is almost three years. Birth intervals are longer in urban areas (39 months)
compared to rural areas (34 months). Rural Upper Egypt experiences the shortest
birth intervals (33 months). According to various international studies the optimal
birth interval is 3 to less than 5 years since this period is strongly associated with
improved health status and lower mortality and morbidity rates for both mother and
child.
Very few studies have been conducted on birth interval dynamics, especially in the
last ten years. The importance of such investigation is also implied from the 2017
fertility goal of reaching replacement level in the current population strategy. Any
further decline in fertility could be accelerated by changing the length of the
reproductive life of women and the length of time between births when women are
exposed to the risk of conception. This calls for innovative interventions, rather
than the usual focus on limiting nunjber of births. This would help in lowering
fertility and hence assist the government in achieving replacement level fertility.

OBJECTIVES
The aim of this study is to analyze birth spacing patterns and preferences in Egypt.
In doing so, the following issues are explored:
Youth attitudes towards the delay of first pregnancy
Characteristics of women who deliver during the optimal birth interval (three
to less than five years) as well as those of women delivering outside this
optimal birth interval and their patterns of preferred birth interval.
Characteristics of women who became pregnant sooner than they wanted.

DATA
This study used the Slow Fertility Transition (SFT) survey data that was conducted
in 2004, as a follow-up to the 2003 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey
(EIDHS-2003). The SFT sample (3,286 women) is a subset of the EIDHS sample of
ever married women 15-49. In addition, information on background characteristics
and reproductive history and intentions for the above subsample of women was
derived from EIDHS-2003 data. Along with the sample of ever married women,
this analysis uses data from the male and female unmarried youth (18-29 years) that
was collected under the SFT survey (954 men and 909 women).
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RESULTS
Attitudes towards First Birth Intervals
Almost fifty percent of male and female youth who were interviewed under SFT
reported that delaying the first pregnancy was a bad idea. Table 4.1 shows that the
younger the male youth (<20), were less likely to reject the idea of delaying first
pregnancy. Those who reside in urban areas and those who desire less than three
children were less likely to reject the idea (40.3% and 41.3%, respectively).
Surprisingly, level of education was not found to be important factor in
differentiating between male youth's attitudes towards delaying the first pregnancy.
Similar to male youth, female youth who desire fewer children were less likely to
reject the idea, as well as those who reside in urban areas. Some regional
differentials in attitudes were also observed with those in urban governorates and
those in Lower Egypt somewhat less likely than those in Upper Egypt to reject the
idea.
Table 4.1: Youth attitudes towards the first birth interval: Percent youth 18-29 who
reported that postponing first pregnancy was a bad idea by background
characteristics, SFT 2004
Background Characteristics
Age
<20
20-24
25+
Education
None
Primary + Preparatory
Secondary +
Residence
Urban
Rural
Region
Urban governorates
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt
Desired number of children
1,2
3+
Total
Number

Males

Females

33.1
45.1
50.0

49.4
49.1
50.0

40.9
42.9
44.4

56.6
48.1
48.7

40.3
47.7

47.9
51.0

41.1
50.3
38.6

47.0
48.5
51.6

41.3
48.5
49.4
954

43.7
58.8
49.3
909

Factors Determining Non-First Birth Intervals
Looking at percent distribution of non-first births (second order and higher births)
occurring in the six years preceding the SFT survey by years since previous birth, it
was found that more than half the non-first births took place less than three years
after the previous child and almost 18 percent of the births were delivered after a
birth interval of five or more years. Thus, only 29 percent of births are born after an
optimal birth interval.
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Table 4.2: Patterns of actual birth intervals: Percent distribution of non-first births
during the 72 months preceding the survey according to birth interval length (in
years) and selected background characteristics, SFT 2004
Background characteristics
Age of mother at childbirth
15-19
20-29
30-39
40+
Sex of prior birth
Male
Female
Survival of prior birth
No
Yes
Birth order
2-3
4+
Any prenatal care
No care
Some care
Preferred timing for birth
Then
Later
No more
Residence
Urban
Rural
Region
Urban governorates
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt
Education
No education
Primary
More than primary
Work status
Yes
No
Wealth index
Lower
Middle
Upper
Total

<3

3-5

5+

Number

Median
(months)

89.2
61.2
33.7
26.2

10.8
31.2
28.3
28.6

0.0
7.5
38.0
45.2

102
1473
803
43

22.8
31.7
47.4
49.8

48.4
57.1

29.9
28.8

21.7
14.0

1231
1189

36.3
32.7

71.9
51.5

19.9
30.0

8.2
18.6

146
2274

24.2
34.8

57.8
44.5

30.5
27.4

11.7
28.1

1497
924

32.4
39.2

57.8
50.5

27.0
30.9

15.2
30.9

729
1285

32.3
35.3

51.8
84.2
36.8

33.4
11.9
25.1

14.8
3.8
38.2

1674
260
434

34.8
23.2
46.5

45.1
57.1

30.3
28.8

24.6
14.0

895
1526

38.7
32.6

42.5
48.6
59.9

31.5
33.1
25.3

26.0
18.2
14.8

380
960
1080

39.3
36.1
31.8

53.9
54.4
49.9

27.1
28.2
32.9

19.0
17.4
17.2

904
708
809

33.5
36.8

44.1
54.7

35.3
28.0

20.6
17.3

443
1978

38.4
33.5

61.6
52.2
41.2
52.7

24.8
30.7
30.7
29.3

13.6
17.1
28.2
17.9

557
1503
361
2421

30.9
34.5
42.4
34.3

Bivariate analysis (Table 4.2) reveals that younger women have greater tendency to
deliver after short birth interval (less than 3 years) as opposed to older women who
tend to delay birth till after at least five years of birth spacing. Urban residents are
more likely to delay their birth (39 months vs. 33 in rural residents). Birth intervals
are longer for women who are working than non-working women (38 months and 34
months, respectively). Although no clear relationship is observed between
education and the length of the birth interval, the birth interval increases almost one
year (12 months) as the woman moves from the lowest to the highest group on the
household wealth index.
The birth interval is longer if the previous birth is a boy (four months longer) but ten
months shorter when the previous birth dies. The higher the order of the birth, the
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longer the birth interval. For fourth and higher order births, the duration is almost
39 months as compared to 32 months among second and third order births.
The table suggests that antenatal care is associated with longer birth intervals. The
median birth interval is above 35 months among births whose mothers received
some antenatal care, compared to around 32 months among those births whose
mothers did not receive any antenatal care.
Regression analysis was used to identify factors that are predictive of shorter birth
spacing intervals. The birth intervals included in this analysis are closed by
definition and were categorized into three groups: (1) intervals that lasted less than
three year period, (2) intervals of duration at least 5, (3) intervals of length 3 to less
than five years this group represents the optimal birth interval (the reference
category). Owing to the nature of our outcome variable as a categorical variable
with three levels, the multinomial logistic model is used. The factors included in
this analysis are thought to be the most influential to differentiate between being in a
specific group of birth intervals versus being among the optimal birth interval.
Table 4.3 presents the odds ratios of having a birth interval of less than 3 years. The
odds of having intervals of greater than 5 years closed birth intervals are not shown
in this paper. l4
The above factors represented characteristics of the mother (her education in years
and working status no work=0, working=l and her age at marriage in years),
husband's characteristics (education in years, occupation professional / managerial /
technical=l, other=0). Household (H.H.) characteristics included wealth index
(lower=l, middle=2 and higher =3) and residence (rural=0, urban=l). Additional
variables for the mother included ideal number of children, exposure to mass media,
ever use of contraception (never used=0 and ever used=l) her autonomy to go out
and buy things (not allowed to go out=0, allowed to go out=l). For the birth starting
the interval the analysis included sex (female=0, male=l) survival (died=0,
living=l), place of delivery (home=0, health clinic=l), antenatal care (no=0, any
care=l), postnatal care (no=0, yes=l), age of mother at birth of the child (less than
30=0, 30+=1). Preference towards the birth closing the interval was also included
(1 ater= 1, no more=2, then=3).
It is worth noting that place of delivery, antenatal care and postnatal care required
special attention, since these questions were only reported for the births that were
delivered during the 5 years preceding EIDHS 2003. Accordingly when they are
included in the model, the sample is substantially reduced by two-thirds, from more
than 1800 to about 600 births (i.e. births following an interval that was initiated in
the five years preceding the EIDHS). As a result, an attempt was also made to use
the information reported for the child closing the interval as a proxy for the child
starting the interval. This attempt was tested based on reports from EIDHS that
women were consistent in accessing services for their children.
14 The reader is reminded that an odds ratio below 1 indicates a decrease in the odds of belonging to
the group under examination (instead of the highest group) with a unit increase in the independent
variable. An odds ratio above 1 indicates an increase, that is, a unit change in the independent
variable is associated with an increase in the odds that the dependent variable is being in that group
(instead of the highest group).
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To determine the influence of the variables under examination, variables are entered
to the model in groups. The first group entered is the mother's characteristics
including her education, age at marriage and working status. Model 7 on Table 4.3
shows that women who are not working are 1.6 times more likely to have shorter
birth intervals. Similarly those in the lowest wealth stratum are 1.7 times more likely
to have shorter birth intervals. Women who are less than 30 years at birth of the
child starting the interval are twice as likely as older mothers to have a shorter birth
interval. As to characteristics of the birth starting the interval, the odds of having a
shorter birth interval increase at least 2.50 times when the prior birth does not
survive and 1.28 times if the previous birth is a girl rather than a boy. Regarding
age of mother at birth, younger mothers (less than 30) are more likely to deliver after
a shorter birth interval (almost 240 percent higher than women who are 30 or
above). Results show that prenatal care is very important. Those women not
receiving any antenatal care are more likely to have a shorter closed birth interval
instead of optimal interval. The odds of belonging to those with shorter birth
interval, rather than those with optimal birth interval, is 128 percent higher among
those who have no antenatal care compared to those who receive some care.

Fertility Behavior between EIDHS and SFT
Another merit of the SFT survey is that we were able to follow up the women who
reported at the EIDHS that they wanted another birth at least one year later and then
observe their behavior during this interval of time between the two surveys. This
follow-up analysis identified characteristics of those women who got "pregnant too
soon". Among the SFT sample of women, the number of women who had reported
at EIDHS that they wanted a child later (at least after one year) is 637 women. SFT
results show that 366 (57.5 percent) of the above women had no births during the
period between the two surveys nor were pregnant at the time of the SFT. The
remaining 271 women (42.5 percent), either gave birth or were pregnant at the time
of the SFT. We refer to the first group as the "did not get pregnant too soon" and
the second group as the "got pregnant too soon".
This study attempts to identify the determinants of not getting pregnant too soon
between the two surveys using logistic regression analysis. The woman's
background information (e.g. age, education, wealth index, region, work status,
number of living children, use of contraception at EIDHS, prenatal care and post
natal care for the last birth) is observed during the EIDHS survey; and then her
fertility behavior and whether she experienced a child death between the EIDHS and
the SFT surveys is reported at the SFT interview. Three additional indices are used
from the SFT: husband-wife agreement, communication with husband regarding
desired family size and the woman's decision making power within the household.
All variables are categorical except the number of living children and the woman's
decision-making power which are treated as continuous variables. The results of the
logistic regression are presented in Table 4.4 for the group of women who wanted
more children later as reported at the EIDHS.
Model I shows that the odds of not becoming pregnant too soon (instead of
becoming pregnant too soon) are higher among women who were using
contraception at the time of EDHS (O.R.=5.7), those who have fewer living children
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(O.R.=0.58), working women (O.R.=2.4), those women who have no child deaths
between the two surveys (O.R. = 33.3), those who agree with their husbands about
childbearing decisions (O.R. = 2.2) those who participate in decision-making within
the family (O.R.= 1.2). Due to the overwhelming influence of contraception that
may obscure the effects of other variables, we omit it from the model and reestimate the model without it, to allow the other variables to have their full effects.
As shown in model 2 on Table 4.4, the significance of all variables remained
unchanged even when contraception was omitted.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS
Owing to the new evidence on the benefits of spacing births 3 to 5 years apart,
this calls for new messages that explain to all family members the benefits of
optimal birth spacing. New messages should emphasize that 3-5 years and not
two years is the optimal interval between two births, regardless of the sex of the
previous child. Message should not only emphasize the health benefits of the 35 birth interval, but also its social implications such as spending more quality
time with children, better position to save money and preserve health. The
above messages should be disseminated through mass media, interpersonal
communication, print material ... etc.
Adequate counseling services are needed for engaged and newly married
couples. The above services should promote spousal communication,
responsible parenting and should help couples who want to delay the first
pregnancy choose a safe contraceptive method that suits their needs.
Women should be encouraged to seek prenatal and postpartum services.
Counseling on optimal birth spacing and use of postpartum contraception
should be integrated within prenatal and postpartum care services. Increased
availability of postpartum family planning services especially contraceptive
methods for breastfeeding women is crucial. Outreach services through Raedat
Rifyat during pregnancy and the postpartum period are needed to counteract
misconceptions about the efficacy of breastfeeding as a contraceptive method
and to promote the consistent and effective use of contraception.
Although, infant and child health care in Egypt have improved dramatically in
the last ten years, however better accessible services, especially to post-neonatal
infants, in the underserved geographical areas would certainly be incremental
and would contribute to achievement of optimal birth spacing intervals.
Significant proportions of women have birth spacing intervals shorter than they
desire. This suggests a need for programs that target husbands through mass
media, religious leaders, agriculture extension workers ... etc. to promote
responsible parenting, spousal communication and husband involvement in
family planning.
Last but not least, programs and policies that address son preference and gender
inequalities are greatly needed for achieving optimal birth spacing intervals.
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Age of mother at birth (=0)
Prenatal care (=0)
Postnatal care (=0)
Place of delivery (=0)
Sex (=0)
Survival (=0)
Birth Interval (=1)
Birth Interval (=2)

Education in years
Age at marriage
Employment Status (=0)
Occupation (=0)
Education in years
Residence (=0)
Wealth Index (=1)
Wealth Index (=2)
Go buy things (=0)
Go Health Clinic (=0)
Ever use (=0)
Desired no. of children
Exposure to mass media

Variables

*p-value < 0.01, "0.01 <p-value<0.05, ***0.05<p-value<0.10

Preferred
Timing

Previous
birth

Mother

Household

Husband

Mother

<3 year

0.993
1.036
1.557
1.079
1.026
1.074
1.832
1.242
0.912
1.038
1.502
1.074
0.971

1.627
1.074
1.026
1.17
1.902
1.223

1.534
1.113
1.02

1.557

Model
4

0.987
1.032

3

Model

0.972"
1.024

2

Model

0.981"
1.025

1

Model

3.115

1.667
0.827
1.341

0.803
0.949

1.623

1.572

1.067
1.125
1.279
2.47

4.803"
1.624
1.523

1.298
2.87

1.273
1.08
1.119

4.523'

0.952
1.688
0.913
1.723
3.189

2.405

0.951
1.675
1.197
0.804
1.219
1.422
1.163
0.956

0.976
1.724
1.202
0.775
1.224
1.29
1.151
0.951
2.391
1.253

1.018

0.868
1.017

0.889

0.986
1.09

Model
8
0.985
1.09

Model
7

0.766

0.509"
2.944
1.204
1.681
1.284
0.98
1.174
0.882
0.566"
2.625
1.149
1.548
1.118
0.983
1.158
0.874

1.052

1.007
1.236
1.595*"

Model
6
0.948""

1.049

1.451

1.009
1.255

0.946"

Model
5

Table 4.3: Odds ratios of the multinomial logistics regression for the length of closed birth interval:
Factors predictive of a <3 year birth interval

0.74
1.001
0.662"
0.878

1.11
0.691
1.058
1.226
0.173*
1.002
0.952
0.56
0.616
0.771

0.889
1.072
0.725
1
0.658"
0.912
0.806
0.389"
1.124
0.61
1.043
1.213
0.143'
1.013
0.921
0.566
0.606
0.708

0.889
2.109
2.697
1.102
0.140*
6.921
2.021
0
3.23
0.273
1.766
1.897
0.141*
0.386
1.797
0.88
0.589
5.072

0.915
2.111
2.213
1.103
0.178*
6.797
1.919
0
1.764
0.186
1.727
1.897
0.181*
0.384
1.926
0.672
0.668

0.988
0.917
0.662"
0.984
0.53*
0.779
0.695
0.401"
1.147
0.574
1.2
1.169

0.976
0.933
0.689"
0.99
0.565"
0.589
0.624

0.989
1.008
0.643"
0.99

Birth Interval (=1)
Birth Interval (=2)
Chi-Square
Degrees of Freedom
Significance
Sample Size

Preferred
timing

*p-value < 0.01, **0.01<p-value<0.05, ***0.05<p-value<0.10

40.697
10
0
2421

Age of mother at birth (=0)
Prenatal care (=0)
Postnatal care (=0)
Place of delivery (=0)
Sex (=0)
Survival (=0)

Previous birth

25.355
6
0
2421

97.397
38
0
597

Go buy things (=0)
Go Health Clinic (=0)
Ever use (=0)
Desired no. of children
Exposure to mass media

Mother

157.146
26
0
2259

Residence (=0)
Wealth Index (-1)
Wealth Index (=2)

Household

135.733
16
0
2421

3.733

Occupation (=0)
Education in years

Father

0.989
1.003

1.792
596.683
42
0
1874
3.473
125.645
42
0
594

512.42
38
0
1874

0.581*
21.195*

0.807
0.396**

0.899
1.071

0.965

0.965

0.98

0.967

0.976

Variables
Education in years
Age at marriage
Employment Status (=0)

5 and over
Mother
0.985

0.946*

Model
8

Model
7

Model
6

Model
5

Model
4

Model
2

Model
1

Model
3
0.95'

Table 4.3 (cont'd): Odds ratios of the multinomial logistics regression for the length of closed birth interval

Table 4.4: Odds ratio of the logistic regression analysis of variables predictive
of "not becoming pregnant too soon"
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Constant
Age
Age<30
Education
None
Primary
Wealth index
Lower
Middle
Region
Urban
Lower
Number of living children
Working status (no)
Use of contraception (yes)
Child died between surveys (yes)
Prenatal care for last birth (yes)
Postnatal care for last birth (yes)
Agreement with husband (low)
Communication with husband (high)
Decision making
X2 test
Degrees of freedom
P-value
Sample size

2.498

6.837*

0.859

0.853

1.615
1.523

1.333
1.283

0.543
1.320

0.932
1.569

0.944
0.395*
0.579*
0.410*
5.697*
0.030***

0.624
0.293*
0.491*
0.551**

1.438
1.143
0.462*
1.310
1 .245***

1.441
1.195
0.407*
1.006
1.292**

128.098
16
0.000
637

74.064
15
0.000
637

* p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, *** 0.05<p-value<0.10
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0.044***

SUMMARY REPORT

PROCEEDINGS OF EGYPT SFT
DISSEMINATION SEMINAR
Laila Nawar and Magued Osman

INTRODUCTION
Within the framework of the Cairo Demographic Center (CDC) Annual
Conference 15 , a one-day seminar was organized to discuss recent trends of fertility in
Egypt. The highlight of the day was a presentation of findings of the joint study
undertaken by the Population Council and the CDC entitled "Slow Fertility
Transition in Egypt (SFT)". This was complemented by a review of other
experiences with fertility decline in the Muslim World. This report presents an
overview of the meeting's presentations and discussions. The seminar was held at
the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Cairo on December 20, 2004 and was attended by over 150
participants representing top and medium level, government officials, researchers,
donor agencies, cooperating agencies and the media.

OPENING SESSION
In the opening session, Magued Osman, former CDC Director, introduced the
seminar. He
was followed
by Barbara
Ibrahim,
STALLED FERTILITY TRANSITION IN EGYPT
Regional
Main Findings
Director of
Policy and Program Implications
SEMINAR
the Population
December 20, 2004
Council's
Regional
Office for
West Asia and
North Africa
in Cairo and
Shadia Attia,
Research and
Monitoring
Advisor,
Health and
Population Division, USAID. Yehia El Hadidy, undersecretary MOHP and Director
of Population and Family Planning Sector, gave the key-note speech on behalf of

UiliUUU

15 Over the last 33 years, the Cairo Demographic Center has maintained the tradition of organizing an
annual conference which is internationally acclaimed as a major event for the dissemination of
findings of research undertaken by the CDC and other international and regional organizations active
in the area of population and development. The forum, usually held towards the end of each year,
brings together senior and junior population scholars as well as CDC faculty and students to
exchange views and debate research findings.
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His Excellency Mohamed Awad Tageldin, former Minister of Health and
Population.
Magued Osman, former CDC Director hailed the Slow fertility Survey as an
exemplary partnership between the Population Council's Frontiers in Reproductive
Health Program, the CDC (which was responsible for data collection), and the
MOHP. The three institutions have come together to examine the critical issue of
fertility trends in Egypt and brought together this important gathering to address
their findings and recommendations to media personnel and policy makers and
program managers.
Barbara Ibrahim, former Regional Director of the Population Council, emphasized
that the study falls within the best tradition of the Population Council's research. It
examines a puzzle that is not easily amenable to standard national survey research
and conventional data analysis. Ibrahim presented the puzzle as follows: Why was
Egypt experiencing a decline in fertility level and then the predictable decline
unpredictably slowed down? She postulated that even though the title of the study
includes the adjective "stalled", nothing is really stalled or stagnant and change is
continuous. The evidence, she believes, lies in that certain dynamics have taken
place among members of the Egyptian families, certain decisions and calculations
have been made and desires about family size have been expressed. All these need to
be understood. Ibrahim concluded her talk by thanking USAID, CIDA, Mellon
Foundation for supporting this study, CDC for collecting data and Fatma El-Zanaty
for providing sampling frame that was used in the present study.
Shadia Attia, Research and Monitoring Advisor at USAID, Cairo, addressed the
seminar (on behalf of Brenda Doe, Team Leader, Health and Population Division,
USAID) saying that this topic was particularly important for USAID, because the
latter has been trying to help the MOHP reach the replacement level of 2.1 children
by 2017. The study, Attia asserted, raises important issues, including that many
women still desire three children or more and son preference is still prevalent. She
reiterated that commitment to the two child norm is essential in the future.
Yehia El Hadidy, Head of the Population & Family Planning Sector at MOHP, who
gave the keynote speech on behalf of His Excellency Mohamed Awad Tageldin,
former Minister of Health and Population, expressed reservation over the term
"stalled" and indicated that fertility has not been stagnant, but in fact has declined
from 5.3 in the 80s to 3.2 at present. It is our job, he said, to first acknowledge the
achievements to be able to speed up the fertility decline. He also asserted that while
it is important to learn from the experience of other countries, it is also important to
give consideration to our own specificities as a country. Magued Osman reassured
participants that the study duly acknowledges all the persistent efforts made by the
Egyptian MOHP to reduce fertility and should be considered an indication of the
desire of the international and local scholarly community to render more assistance
towards the achievement of replacement level fertility.
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Session 1: SFT Study Findings and Policy Implications
Chair: Laila Nawar, Research Advisor, CDC
SFT Main Study Findings
After giving a brief background on the current status of fertility decline in Egypt,
John Casterline and Rania Roushdy of the Population Council, presented the
motivation, main objective, data collection process and key findings of the SFT
project. The presentation highlighted how, following a period of relatively rapid
decline in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Egyptian fertility decline has slowed down
during the 1990s. The most recent EDHS (Egypt Interim DHS (EIDHS) 2003)
shows a marked drop in fertility since the 2000 EDHS, an indication that the fertility
decline may be picking up speed once again. Nevertheless, the total fertility rate,
estimated at 3.2 in the 2003 survey, remains more than one child above the
replacement-level. The main objective of the SFT project has been to address
critical questions about the current status of the fertility decline in Egypt and the
prospects for a further decline to replacement-level fertility. The project has focused
on investigating attitudes toward childbearing and, in particular, receptivity to the
two-child family.
The SFT re-interviewed a subsample of 3,286 currently married women who were
interviewed in the 2003 EIDHS as well as samples of young, never-married women
and men (917 women and 945 men). The analysis of the SFT and EIDHS data
highlights that a transition from Egypt's current fertility rate of 3.2 births per woman
to the replacement level will require reductions in both wanted and unwanted
fertility. A second, equally important point is that replacement-level fertility is
unlikely to be achieved until virtually all Egyptians accept two children as their
childbearing goal. However, data collected for the SFT project reveals that
widespread acceptance of a two-child norm is still lacking at present among
currently married women. Even among younger adults, who are in the early stages
of their reproductive lives or are about to begin childbearing, a substantial fraction
still considers three or more children to be desirable. 16
Nahla Abdel-Tawab, Regional Advisor, Frontiers in Reproductive Health Program,
delineated the key policy and programmatic implications of the SFT study findings.
She emphasized that in order to achieve replacement level by the year 2017,
programs should target both desired and undesired fertility. She drew the audience's
attention to the study's assertion that younger generations are hardly different than
older generations with regard to the number of children they desire. It is imperative,
she reiterated, to focus on young people, in order to be able to change their beliefs
and attitudes. According to Abdel-Tawab, school curricula should be revised to
promote the two-child culture and more egalitarian gender roles.
Abdel-Tawab said it is important to emphasize the role of reproductive health
services to avoid undesired fertility. This is accomplished through adequate
counseling services for married couples, in order to offer them the appropriate
contraceptive that meets their needs and to ensure correct and continuous use of
16 For more details on the study design and findings see Casterline, J.B. and R. Roushdy, "Slow
Fertility Transition in Egypt" Population Council - FRONTIERS, 2006 (forthcoming).
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contraceptives. As we do that, we must address fear of contraceptives and their side
effects, she reminded the audience. Doctors and providers must be trained not only
to offer contraceptives to women, but also to show them how to deal with their side
effects, and how to switch from one contraceptive to the other without getting
pregnant.
She also stated that the study findings suggest the need to expand the scope of
counseling, not only to cover health and family planning, but also to include
husband-wife communication, division of roles, economic goals and the cost of
children. It is also essential to link family planning with reproductive health,
otherwise, she said, we would be missing opportunities. Women who go to public
clinics for prenatal or postnatal care should have the opportunity to receive a family
planning message. This is how we can overcome undesired fertility, she reiterated.
To reinforce the culture of two children, Abdel-Tawab highlighted the role of media,
saying that it carries the burden of changing beliefs. Mass media play a major role
in promoting consumer demand and are capable of changing social norms. Along
the same lines, the media should play a role in promoting the culture of two children.
To do so, it must personalize the message and not treat it as a public issue. Media
has to try to answer the question: How will my family and 1 be affected if 1 have a
third child? Everyone seems to know that a family of seven members is a large
family. Now we all need to know that a family of three children is also a large
family.
In the realm of policies, Abdel-Tawab said that measures and policies that support
girls' education and employment are greatly needed. Legalisations that are not
consistent with the two-child goal should be reconsidered e.g. maternity leave for
more than two living children.
The first discussant, Hoda Rashad, Director of the Social Research Center, refuted
the proposition made by the principal investigators, that replacement level fertility
will not be achieved unless virtually all parents want to have two children. She
argued that not all women who want two children will be able to get two children.
This is partly because not all women will be able to marry and partly because some
married will have one child while others will be infertile. Also, not all women who
want to have children will have two. They may have one child or may not have
children at all. The study does not adequately address these two possibilities, and
refers only briefly to the changing marriage trends and their impact on fertility.
Another important issue is the tempo of fertility. A paper on China indicated that
China need not restrict fertility to one child per family to achieve its population
targets. Families can have two children because population growth depends in part
on the "tempo of fertility" i.e. at what age women have children. Hence, marriage
and tempo are two important factors to be considered.
The SFT study also indicated that desired fertility for the urban, more socially
developed and educated women appears higher than usual, and that the differentials
between the educated and the non-educated is not very high, with the exception of
illiterate women. Rashad highlighted the need for examining the quality of
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secondary and university education to understand why a significant proportion of
educated men and women sill want to have three children.
According to Rashad, the setting of priorities is not only about how to intervene but,
more importantly, how likely one will succeed. The inclination is to work on the
unwanted fertility because it is much more doable. In fact the study presented
important information on the level of unwanted fertility but did not analyze the
potential decline if unwanted fertility had been avoided, and this is a shortcoming of
the study.
Rashad highlighted the importance of promoting couple's sense of social
responsibility and responsible parenting. Finally, Rashad highlighted women's
empowerment and income generation as a means to achieving replacement level
fertility. According to Rashad, society needs to realize that women's employment is
not just a right for women, but is also the right of society. She concluded by saying
that if unemployment remains high for women, no one should be surprised if they
have three and more children.
Fatma El Zanaty, second discussant, pointed out that the SFT study is important
because it is a longitudinal study (two rounds). It used a sub-sample of the 2003
EIDHS which makes the data more comprehensive than DHS. Merging the data of
the EIDHS with the data of the SFT, allows for more in-depth analysis of fertility
desires and preferences and the consistency of the data. With regard to the study
sample, it is a sub-sample of currently married women aged 15-45, which means that
any analysis of EIDHS data for comparison must be limited to those women who
were interviewed in the SFT. However, some figures presented by the authors in this
study, such as the fertility figures, refer to all women interviewed in the EDHS.
As for the never married women (18-29), another sample from the household listing
of the EIDHS, El Zanaty warned that we have to be cautious and not make sweeping
generalizations from it for the following two reasons:
- The sample size is relatively small.
- The substitution of cases in the field by the fieldwork staff may affect national
representation, especially given the fact that weights could not be accurately
calculated and thus the results represented are un-weighted. El Zanaty said we
may in fact be dealing with a sample that represents a somewhat different
population than the EIDHS. However, the results of the never married were
close to results of other previous studies; i.e. their fertility desires are less than
married women. How significant is the difference between their desire and that
of older women, is really the issue.
With regard to the questionnaire, the study relied on a very comprehensive
questionnaire, but the attitudinal questions, and the statements that were read out to
the respondents, may have affected the quality of the data. El Zanaty had one
comment about the puzzle, i.e. that couples recognize the benefits of a two-child
family but still express contradictory desires for three or more children. She said that
the difference between two and three children is very subtle and respondent's may
have not been very clear on whether a small family comprises two or three children.
In many countries with low fertility, the desired fertility is higher than the actual
fertility, observed El Zanaty, which shows that actual fertility can be 2.1 when
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wanted fertility is higher than that. She also noted that the marital fertility rate had
not been examined, and we ought to determine whether it has declined as much as
the TFR or not.
El Zanaty commented on what appears to be an inconsistency. The findings, saying
that the results do not surprise her. Despite what appears to be an inconsistency, the
findings are in agreement with the relationship between desired and actual fertility in
other studies. These studies also show that the desired number of children is slightly
higher for men than their wives. The role of husbands is important in changing
fertility level in Egypt and requires further investigation. The role of religious
clergymen encouraging couples to have many children should also be addressed, she
said.
El Zanaty's final query was how policies and programs can be converted into
specific plans of action to be implemented and followed up in order to reach the
desired fertility rate of 2.1 by 2017.
The floor discussion, cautioned against putting the entire burden of changing
attitudes on the media. What is needed is a long term strategy that involves MOHP
and other ministries e.g. education, information, and others.
Other comments focused on fertility attitudes and other countries' experience with
fertility transition. The situation in Egypt is not unusual, and in fact is similar to
other countries that have reached the last stage of the transition that is marked by
very slow decline. Taking that into consideration, we have to accept Bongaarts'
latest assertion that once the transition starts it will never stop, but might take a long
time.
The increase in unwanted fertility should not be considered a weakness when
assessing the effectiveness of the family planning programs, since numerous
country-evidence has shown that unwanted fertility will increase rather than
decrease when approaching the last stage of the fertility transition. Instead of
discussing unwanted fertility, we should discuss the type of programs that would
enable women to translate their desires into actions.
Another participant argued that the population problem in Egypt is one of quality
and not only quantity. The call for change, at this juncture, should not be reducing
the size of the family, but should be about responsible parenting. Couples should
recognize that children are not only means of support to their parents currently and
in old-age. But in fact raising children is costly, not an easy task and could be a
burden. At the same time, some efforts should be directed towards developing
effective retirement homes and schemes, in order for families to recognize the
existence of other financial resources apart from children that would help them
through old age.
One participant argued that we can not achieve the two-child goal unless we change
our views on gender roles and responsibilities. In Egypt there is a high degree of
segregation of gender roles. Women still do domestic chores and house
responsibilities, while men go out to earn money for their families. As long as this
cultural complex persists, the desire for girls and boys will be functionally
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imperative. If we do not think that a daughter can go out to work and help support
the parents in old age, we will desire a son. And if we do not think that a son can
help with domestic chores and be a nurturing partner in the family, we will want a
daughter.
A couple of methodological comments were raised about the study. The first
questioned the sensitivity of the questions in gaging respondents' fertility desires.
The second comment criticized use of the TFR. According to the participant, the use
of TFR to measure change in fertility is not suitable for designing policy. It would
be better to do in-depth analysis or other advanced techniques such as the parity
progression ratio.

Session 2: International Experience
Chair: Barbara Ibrahim
The first paper by Mehtab Karim of the Aga Khan University in Pakistan, entitled:
"Socio economic development, population policies and fertility decline in Muslim",
examines fertility decline in 50 Muslim countries. These 50 countries are
characterized by great diversity in terms of their ethnic, cultural and socioeconomic
background. Although Muslim populations rank below the world's average in terms
of levels of socio economic development, there are wide variations among them.
Mass education and development of mass communications, in most of these
countries, is weakening the traditional values and norms and leading to inroads of
Western culture, despite some resistance. He concluded that there appears to be no
typical pattern of reproductive behavior which can be described as an Islamic type.
Hence, Islam seems to be neither a hindrance nor a stimulating factor in fertility
decline. He also noted that the demographic transition has begun in most of the
Muslim-majority countries some time over the past two decades. In some countries
it has moved faster than others. In most cases, however, governments in the Muslim
countries have adopted a positive approach towards birth control.
The second speaker, Barakat-e-Khuda, Senior Associate, Abt Associates Inc.
Bethesda, USA, presented his joint paper with Nazneen Anwar, Public Health
Specialist, Institute of Public Health, Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka. The paper,
entitled "Fertility Transition in Bangladesh", examines the recent substantial fertility
decline in Bangladesh. Over the past three decades the total fertility rate has
declined by about half, from 6.3 in 1971-75 to 3 in 2001-03. During this period, the
contraceptive prevalence rate increased by a factor of more than seven, from less
than 8 percent in 1975 to 58 percent in 2004. The study examines how this decline
was made possible. The authors attribute the decline to the strong family planning
program, supported by favorable social, political and religious conditions. However,
they do not believe these factors alone were responsible for these achievements.
Other socio-economic changes rendered the decline possible, such as female
empowerment, mobility, education and employment in the nonagricultural sector.
The latter was mainly due to increasing landlessness and shrinking employment
opportunities in the agricultural sector.
The third speaker: Chris Wilson, of the World Population Program, IIASA, Austria,
presented a paper, entitled "Recent Trends and Components of Change in Fertility in
Egypt", authored by his colleague Henriett Engelhardt, Vienna Institute of
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Demography, Austria. This paper examines the contention of some scholars in
recent years that the fertility transition in Egypt has slowed down or even stalled.
Lately, demographers have realized that the TFR as the conventional measure of
fertility is a poor indicator of fertility for a population that is undergoing rapid
fertility transition as in Egypt. If child bearing is postponed and, subsequently, the
mean age at childbearing increases, the observed TFR would be lower than in the
absence of such timing changes. Thus, the observed stalling of total fertility in
Egypt could be caused by a change in the timing of the first and subsequent births.
The study investigates the levels and changes in fertility in Egypt using information
on mean age at birth provided by the 1992, 1995, and 2000 EDHSs. This paper also
examines the proximate determinants of fertility and considers a new method for
assessing the impact of socio economic determinants of fertility.
The floor discussion started with comments on Wilson's presentation. The EDHS
confirmed that fertility did not reach a plateau, but in fact declined slightly from mid
1990s to 2000. The TFR has sometimes been underestimated in DHS surveys
because of a tendency for births to be dated earlier than they actually occurred, in
order to avoid the further detailed questioning about each birth during the recent five
years. This error has been reduced starting with the 1995 EDHS, by doing the
detailed birth-by-birth inquiry for births in the recent five years but calculating the
TFR for the three-year period preceding the survey. So while there is a big
difference in 1992 and 1995, the figure for 2000 is 3.5 which was indicated for the 5
years.
Another comment was raised on Wilson's presentation. Wilson mentioned that he
was doubtful about the application of the Bongaarts model to the Egyptian data. In
this application, the predicted fertility from the model was higher than the actual
fertility - that is, it seems that fertility in Egypt ought to be higher than it actually is.
But he used in his model three of the four proximate determinants, as there was not
enough information on induced abortion. Induced abortion might account for the
further reduction in fertility. As for induced abortion, it all depends on which
position one takes. One could take the position that abortion is permitted in Islam
during the first 120 days. Because of that reason, abortion is widely practiced in
Pakistan, and the annual number of abortions is about one million. In Pakistan,
abortion is a cultural but not a religious taboo and so women will not answer
questions about abortion. If Wilson factors abortion in, he might perhaps get an
answer to his question.
A final comment highlighted that the TFR trends in the two MENA countries,
Tunisia and Turkey, were different from all other countries because abortion is legal
there. With regard to the case of Pakistan, there might be in fact more underlying
factors than was brought out by the data that has been collected.

Session 3: Addressing Challenges to Achieving Lower Fertility
Chair: Yehia El Hadidy
The afternoon session was designed to highlight the policy and program
implications of the SFT study. In this session, panelists' presentations and floor
discussions were made in Arabic. Once more, El Hadidy confirmed the critical role
to be played by the media in the next phase and expressed his delight for the notable
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presence of the media representatives in the seminar. He asserted that his
Excellency Awad Tageldin, the Minister of Health and Population was eager to
receive the seminar report and recommendations on how to speed up the decline in
fertility.
The first speaker, Magued Osman, CDC Director, presented the findings of the SFT
study in a less technical manner than the morning presentation. Osman also
addressed marriage, the main determinant of fertility in Egypt. According to
CAPMAS 2000 statistics, there has been no decline in marriage rates in fact there
are indications that those rates are rising. Even with the delay in the average age at
marriage, most people eventually marry. Then the first child comes quickly without
any delay, and the duration between the first and following child is not long either.
In fact, some studies have shown that educated working women prefer to complete
their reproduction agenda over a short period so they can go back to their jobs after a
four or five-year leave from work. A third child may come after a period of time for
any reason, which might include the failure of the contraceptive method or changing
fertility goals.
In his concluding remarks, Osman summarized his presentation by stressing that the
SFT study points to a very critical fact, which is the unclear desire among the
married couples to reduce the number of children or have two children only. There
seems to be always a place for a third child. However, the puzzle is when they were
asked about small families, everyone seemed to know the benefits of a small family
in comparison to larger one. There seems to be some kind of cognitive dissonance
among members of the Egyptian family: They believe in the benefits and value of a
small family, and yet they desire three and more children.
The second speaker, Hussein Abdel Aziz, Director of POLICY Project, pointed out
that when addressing policy implications, we have to distinguish between two kinds
of programs. The first has to do with service provision this includes family
planning and reproductive health services and the second is the general framework
within which these programs operate. He opted to begin by the general framework,
because it is the governing framework. To do that, he referred to findings and
conclusions of other studies that also resulted from work undertaken by the
Population Council in the past. Previous experience has shown that countries that
embarked on demographic transition continue to follow this trend until there is a
considerable decline in fertility but not necessarily to the replacement level. Thus,
tempo and level of decline is the challenge, and those depend on the supporting
policies and the environment that enhances these policies. Previous studies have
shown that at the beginning of the demographic transition the decline is fast then it
slows down towards the end. In fact, this explains why El Hadidy said that fertility
decline does not stop but it slows down. Towards the end of the fertility transition,
factors other than implemented programs become influential. According to previous
studies, two main factors have played a critical role. These are:
1. Life expectancy at birth: In countries that have achieved replacement level,
life expectancy has reached 75 years.
2. Literacy level: In these countries it reached 95%
Hence, as Egypt moves towards the final stage of the demographic transition, i.e. the
replacement level, it has to achieve a favorable climate that enhances the above two
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components. All other countries that crossed the replacement level threshold passed
by these two gates. A third factor is the economic standard of living, which the SFT
study has shown to be insignificant. Other poor countries were able to reduce
fertility significantly by working on the above two factors only. For example,
Indonesia succeeded in decreasing fertility by reducing illiteracy. In other countries
this was possible by improving life expectancy or the indicators of health status:
child mortality, infant mortality and maternal mortality. Thus, at a certain level, we
should stop focusing on family planning programs exclusively and start paying
parallel attention to policies that enhance implemented programs.
Moreover, in order to reduce actual fertility, unwanted fertility has to be reduced.
Even if fertility levels came close to two children, the TFR will be high because of
unwanted fertility, which differs from one country to the other according to the FP
methods used and their effectiveness. In some countries e.g. Turkey, large portions
of unwanted fertility were reduced through induced abortion - a method that we
reject in Egypt. Here comes the challenge for the national family planning programs,
which is how to operate within existing social values. And again, here lies the
difference between the Egyptian experience and the experience of other countries.
The challenge, said Abdel Aziz, is how to reduce unwanted fertility without
adopting methods such as induced abortion.
The mass media has succeeded in enhancing our knowledge about family planning
but has not succeeded as much in increasing acceptance of the small family, perhaps
because it is a fluid notion. When people say they want three children, they still
believe they are talking about a small family, while we want them to think in terms
of only two, said Abdel Aziz. The task of the media is to explain very specifically
what we mean by a small family, that it is the family composed of two children
regardless of their sex.
Based on the experience of other countries, the first change that occurs is the change
in the level of desired fertility. In 2000, the number was 2.9 and in 2003, the number
became 2.5. To what extent the decline is real is another question. Studies also tell
us that the lower the level of desired fertility, the higher the relative level of
unwanted fertility. So if we want to have two children only and the actual fertility
rate is three, then the unwanted fertility is one child. Thus, the first step is to focus
on desired fertility, and the mass media has the main role here. Determining the
target group in this case is very important. We should focus on the group less than
30 years of age, because they will be responsible for shaping fertility levels in the
future.
Unwanted fertility on the other hand is influenced by four factors. The first is the
degree of commitment to implement reproductive preferences, so the question to ask
here is if the desired number of children is two, to what degree are married couples
capable and committed to this number. Committed means seeking to achieve a goal,
while capable means that the family planning program enables couples to implement
their desires. In addition, the higher the quality of the family planning program, the
higher the likelihood that couples would be able to achieve and adhere to their
reproductive preferences. In the end, however, this is all a function of education and
life expectancy at birth. But what level of education? The answer is a level that is
capable of changing attitudes. The second factor is the efficacy of family planning
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methods. Each country has a method that is most popular. For example, in Turkey
the condom is the most popular method, but only because it is backed up by
abortion. In Egypt, IUD and injectables account for 60-65% of the methods used.
The third factor is induced abortion which is completely rejected in Egypt. And the
fourth factor is exposure to pregnancy. When considering policy implications, we
have to examine these four factors and determine to what extent we can manipulate
them through enhancing program effectiveness.
Previous studies indicate that unwanted fertility will rise as society moves towards
reducing actual fertility. This explains some contradictions, for example the study
findings indicated that 58% of the unwanted fertility was among those who practice
family planning. Does this mean that the family planning program is not capable of
fulfilling couples' needs? The answer is no, because their fertility level has indeed
declined but they do not use the methods at the required level of efficacy.
To conclude, Abdel Aziz stressed that any program aimed at the demographic
transition should not be confined to narrow health issues, but should be broad
enough to take into account the impact of life expectancy at birth and literacy, which
have impacted fertility in other countries. Any national program for family planning
will not achieve full success unless all other elements work together to reach its
goals. We also have to give consideration to the specificities of the Egyptian society.
We have to admit, for example, that the first child is of great social, demographic
and even medical importance. What we can do to solve this problem is to develop
policies that would help delay the age at marriage.
Finally, he stressed that the Egyptian Family Planning Program does not operate in a
vacuum. If the social and economic environment does not support the program, it
will not achieve the required goals.
The Third Speaker, Safaa El Baz, Assistant to the Minister of Health for National
Population Council's Affairs, made a brief statement in which she emphasized that
when the government launches a new program, whether it is population or economic
or any other program, it is implemented and then evaluated or adjusted as part of the
process of implementation, necessarily use the same approach throughout the
program. She reminded the audience that we are now in a very critical stage,
because we have been following a national population policy for twenty years, and
what has been said today will place a big burden on our shoulders. What we
implemented in the past was easy; what is coming in the future is more difficult,
because in the future we will need to change behaviors and attitudes and this is not
an easy venture.
El Baz also voiced her opinion that educational level was indeed very critical. In the
past, government schools imbedded in us a sense of responsibility towards society,
which is no longer the case. She seconded Abdel Aziz on the need to enhance the
role of education, so there would be no conflicts between individual and collective
goals. She also believed that rural/urban differentials need to be addressed. The SFT
study claimed there were no substantial regional differences, but this is not always
the case. El Baz said that our goal should be to achieve holistic overall
development. But the truth is that so far the link between the different components
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of the development plan is missing, and no one seems to ask the question: what
should the Egypt we wish to create look like?
After a brief summary of the highlights of the three presentations, El Hadidy opened
the floor for discussion. Again the role of the media was emphasized. The media
should not focus on direct messages. Indirect messages within soap operas, movies
and plays are more influential. In the next stage, we need a responsible media, and
what the media will convey from now on should resonate with the population policy.
The media message will not succeed unless the goals set by policy makers are
humane, genuine and accessible. If citizens are persuaded that what is asked of
them is convincing and does not conflict with their personal interests, they will
adhere to what is required. Thus, it is important to focus in the next stage on the
content of the media messages and their humane and psychological dimensions.
A comment focused on the disparities in human development indices between
governorates. It is misleading at this point to discuss policies of the national level.
We should determine first a plan of action based on input from the governorates,
which will ultimately provide us with the national plan. For instance, the issue of
two or three children might differ from one governorate to the other.
It is indeed difficult to delay the first pregnancy, and it might in fact be advisable to
deal with delaying the first birth and delaying the marriage-age as one package.
However, we should not also rule out completely the possibility that some
population segments may respond to postponing the first child. We simply need to
find out if this is the right course of action. If it is proved correct, this would also
require training physicians to give the correct advice. Some couples might be good
candidates to postpone the first pregnancy, but others might not. We need to give
more attention towards tailoring our message to the individual need of every couple.
A final comment highlights the role of youth centers, and sports and social clubs.
Also, the government should not carry alone the burden of reducing fertility. NGOs
have an important role to play, particularly those that have chapters in the
governorates.

SUMMARY OF KEY POLICY AND PROGRAM
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on presentations made and subsequent discussion, the following key policy
and program recommendations were raised during the seminar:
The media should assume a responsible role in promoting the culture of two
children. It must be made clear that the small family comprises only two
children, regardless of sex. Media messages should be addressed to younger
cohorts to change their attitudes and beliefs. Indirect messages through various
channels should be attempted, keeping in mind that the message content should
be personalized, and at the same time their humane and psychological
dimensions should be carefully tested.
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Family planning program should help couples avoid unwanted fertility and
achieve their reproductive goals. This may be achieved through providing high
quality services, including proper counseling on appropriate methods to use,
correct method use, how to manage method side-effects and how to switch to
other methods without getting pregnant.
Also, the visits of women to health facilities seeking various types of
reproductive health services should be capitalized on to recruit more women for
family planning use and to help them avoid unplanned pregnancies.
Despite the deep rooted cultural norms favoring having the first child soon after
marriage, it is important to encourage and support young adults who express
desire to postpone the first birth. Special training programs need to be designed
for physicians to provide counseling to young adults and newly weds, and to
advise on appropriate methods to use and strategies to follow.
This activity should be backed-up by well designed media messages that portray
the advantages of postponing the first birth while at the same time dealing with
fears and concerns surrounding delaying the first birth.
For the long term policies, educational curricula need to be revised and restructured so as to reinforce a strong sense of responsibility, especially
responsible parenthood, and to instill more egalitarian gender roles.
Reducing fertility is not the responsibility of MOHP alone. It requires concerted
efforts of different governmental and non-governmental organizations.
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